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INTRODUCTION
Owen Fiss has led an enviable life. The Sterling Professor Emeritus at Yale
Law School is a revered teacher; author of dozens of books and articles on pro-
cedure, constitutional law, and legal theory;1 and one of the most cited legal
scholars of all time.2 Devotion to Brown v. Board of Education,' the liberalism it
fostered,' and the Warren Court pervade Fiss's life as a law clerk, lawyer, and
professor. They also pervade his writings, even his magisterial Holmes Devise
volume on the Fuller Court.' In Pillars ofJustice: Lawyers and the Liberal Tradition,
a book written "to inspire and instruct" the young,6 Fiss introduces us to his legal
liberalism, Yale, and heroes -Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, John Doar,
Burke Marshall, Harry Kalven, Eugene Rostow, Arthur Leff, Catharine MacKin-
non, Joseph Goldstein, Robert Cover, Morton Horwitz, Carlos Nino, and
Aharon Barak. Each of these individuals shares, Fiss maintains, a devotion to
Brown as a transformative event that made law an anvil for hammering out
Americans' most sacred ideals.7 All also lived lives that provide "guidance for an-
yone who wonders how he or she might achieve something in this world that is
worthwhile and good."'
While that sounds portentous, the book is anything but. Fiss's generosity of
spirit and capacity for friendship shine through on every page. His marvelous
portraits are evocative, moving, and sometimes unexpectedly amusing, as when
the young Fiss, eager to discuss a case, raced into Thurgood Marshall's chambers
one morning and belatedly "noticed [his] pajamas coming through the bottom
1. See Owen M. Fiss, List of Publications, YALE L. SCH. (Oct. io, 2015), http://law.yale.edu
/system/files/documents/faculty/ofiss pubs2017.pdf [http://perma.cc/C6P5-MGP9].
2. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 424 (2000); Fred R.
Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles ofAll Time, 110 MICH. L. REV.
1483, 1489-92 (2012).
3. 34 7 U.S. 4 83 (1954).
4. OWEN M. Fiss, PILLARS OF JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND THE LIBERAL TRADITION 1-2 (2017).
5. See OWEN M. Fiss, VIII THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at
9-12, 394-95 (1993).
6. FISS, supra note 4, at 1.





of [his] slacks."9 Pillars enlists history and biography to explain our duty to fur-
ther reason through law. And, since, as Fiss recognizes, " [a] 11 biography is a form
of autobiography,"o his essays tell as much about the author as his subjects.
This Review proceeds in two Parts. Part I explores Fiss's views on his lumi-
naries, Brown, legal liberalism, and Yale. I group the discussion into five catego-
ries - civil rights idols, sympathetic colleagues, friendly critics, legal cosmopoli-
tans, and students (who make frequent guest appearances and star in the chapter
on MacKinnon and in Fiss's coda, "Toiling in Eden")." Part II discusses the crit-
icisms of Brown, the Warren Court, and legal liberalism that are missing in Fiss's
paean. I question Fiss's version of the history of Yale and his ideal of legal edu-
cation, and maintain that he overlooks the role of legal realism in creating the
school, Brown, and legal liberalism. I then query whether legal liberalism re-
mains as viable for the present as Fiss contends. Finally, I query whether his sub-
jects should and can still serve as our models.
I. THE PILLARS AND THE PORTRAITIST
By situating his encounters in the context of his own autobiography, Fiss
enables us to observe one Pilgrim's Progress. We see the embodiment of the mer-
itocratic ideal rebelling against process theorists in the Slough of Despond-i.e.,
Harvard - then moving forward armed with his heroes' rectitude, faith in rea-
son, and legal liberalism. We witness Fiss's deep attachment o the Warren Court
and Brown, watch him championing them against all comers on the right and
left, and charging students to restore them. For Fiss, the Warren Court and Yale
are the Celestial City.12
Born in 1938, Fiss grew up in modest circumstances in a Bronx Sephardic
Jewish household." Good grades took him to Stuyvesant High School in Man-
hattan, then to Dartmouth.14 At Oxford, he studied philosophy with Gilbert
Ryle, H.L.A. Hart, Isaiah Berlin, and other greats, until he wearied of witnessing
"the insular quality of the inquiries that then dominated the profession," while
reading about the civil rights struggles at home.
9. Id. at 21.
10. Id. at 4.
ii. Id. at 117-27, 189-94.
12. JOHN BUNYAN, THE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS (Oxford World's Classics 2003) (1678).
13. Id. at 163-64.
14. See Owen M. Fiss, Curriculum Vitae, YALE L. SCH. (Aug. 26, 2015), http://law.yale.edu/sites
/default/files/documents/faculty/fiss-cv.pdf [http://perma.cc/77ZR-ZXF6].
15. Fiss, supra note 4, at 4.
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His years in law school from 1961 to 1964, however, brought him no closer
to the revolution. Fiss enrolled at Harvard "at a time when civil rights and the
Brown ruling made only fleeting appearances in the curriculum."16 His teachers,
almost all of them legal process theorists, channeled their patron saint, Felix
Frankfurter." Obsessed with the supposedly antidemocratic nature of judicial
review -Alexander Bickel's famed "counter-majoritarian difficulty"" -process
theorists demanded better reasoning, more principled distinctions, and greater
fidelity to the judicial role.19 They mocked Chief Justice Warren for his questions
about "whether a particular legal position was 'just.' Sophisticated legal scholars
did not speak that way."2 0
Fortuitously, however, Paul Freund, "in his kind, stately way,"21 encouraged
Fiss to write about the impact of Brown v. Board of Education on public school
desegregation outside the South.22 Fiss now escaped the intellectual prison of
Harvard -as he portrays it -and found his calling. He would develop a legal
process theory that enshrined reason and extolled the Warren Court and the Jus-
tices who handed down Brown as "public officials situated within a profession,
bounded at every turn by the norms and conventions that define and constitute
that profession."2 3 He would also become an exponent of legal liberalism, trust
in the potential of federal courts, particularly the Warren Court, to produce pos-
itive, permanent change for the disempowered.
16. Id.
17. For a more extended discussion of process theory and the atmosphere at Harvard during this
period, see LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 30-51 (1996).
18. ALEXANDERM. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAROF
POLITICS 16 (Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962).
ig. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term -Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84, 99-100 (1959) (suggesting that the Supreme Court should take
fewer cases in order to have time to write adequately reasoned opinions); G. Edward White,
The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L.
REv. 279, 286-91 (1973) (setting out the tenets of reasoned elaboration defining the legal pro-
cess school). See generally HENRYM. HART,JR. &ALBERTM. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw (1958) (organizing cases and materials
around a process-centric vision of the law).
20. Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice, So WASH. & LEE L. REv. 5, 11
(1993).
21. FIss, supra note 4, at 4.
22. The essay subsequently provided the basis for his first article. Owen M. Fiss, Racial Imbalance
in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564 (1965).




A. Idols: Civil Rights Lawyers and Judges
Fiss's two clerkships deepened his commitment to this project. Fittingly, his
first trip outside New York came as a high school senior in 1955, when he toured
the Supreme Court and saw Thurgood Marshall unsuccessfully urging the im-
mediate desegregation of public elementary and secondary schools in the second,
remedial phase of Brown v. Board ofEducation.24 "A tall Black lawyer- set in a sea
of white faces-was addressing the Justices, and all eyes were fixed on him," he
writes of that "electrifying" moment.25 At their clerkship interview eight years
later, Marshall, then a Second Circuit judge, teased Fiss about his Harvard edu-
cation, which the judge referred to "with a respectful disdain,"26 and told stories,
as the great raconteur continued to do through the clerkship year. Consequently,
Fiss, Marshall's only clerk, uncomplainingly worked "late into the night to catch
up on [his] assignments."27
During that "thrilling" year,28 Fiss watched the unassuming Marshall resist
Second Circuit powerhouses like Henry Friendly, who disapproved of the War-
ren Court's criminal procedure revolution.2 9 Though it had taken the Senate al-
most a year to confirm Marshall's appointment, and he lacked the prestigious
connections to Wall Street law firms that many of his new colleagues possessed,
he bravely defended the Warren Court.o Fiss viewed Marshall's 1967 appoint-
ment to the Supreme Court as a "transcendent moment" in American history
and for liberals."
Alas, Richard Nixon's attack on the Warren Court in 1968 paid off, and the
new President, with his four Court appointments, cut short the jubilation. As a
result, Justice Marshall spent most of his tenure besieged by the conservative
assault on Brown32 and censuring his colleagues' rightward turn." Think, for
example, of Marshall's dissent in Milliken v. Bradley, condemning the majority's
24. 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Fiss, supra note 4, at 164.
25. Fiss, supra note 4, at 19.
26. Id. at 20.
27. Id. at 23.
28. Id. at 21.
29. See, e.g., Fred P. Graham, Court Scored by Top Judge Here: AJurist Nixon May Name Urges Curbs
on Liberal Trend, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. io, 1968, at 73.
30. FIss, supra note 4, at 22.
31. Id. at 24.
32. Id. at 25.
33 Id.
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refusal to rule that intentional school segregation in one district justified multi-
district busing as an "emasculation of our constitutional guarantee of equal pro-
tection of the laws."34 Yet, displays of temper remained rare. The Justice was a
"passionate" but "disciplined" individual who loved the law for its "redemptive
possibilities" and never lost sight of it as "a source of radical hope."" With Mar-
shall's retirement in 1991, the country lost the twentieth century's "most accom-
plished lawyer."3 6
If Fiss counts Marshall as the greatest lawyer, he leaves no doubt that Wil-
liam Brennan, for whom he clerked from 1965 to 1966, was the Court's best Jus-
tice. While Fiss acknowledges the important roles of the executive branch, Con-
gress, and the civil rights and welfare rights movements, he claims that it was
the Warren Court that transformed the nation:
In the 1950s, America was not a pretty sight. Jim Crow reigned supreme.
Blacks were systematically disenfranchised and excluded from juries.
State-fostered religious practices, such as school prayer, were pervasive.
Legislatures were grossly gerrymandered and malapportioned. McCar-
thyism stifled dissent, and the jurisdiction of the censor over matters
deemed obscene or libelous had no constitutional limits. The heavy hand
of the criminal law threatened those who publicly provided information
and advice about contraceptives, imperiling the most intimate of human
relationships and exposing women to the burdens of unwanted pregnan-
cies. The states had a virtually free hand in the administration of criminal
justice. Trials often proceeded without counsel or jury. Convictions were
allowed to stand even when they turned on illegally seized evidence or
on statements extracted from the accused by coercion. There were no
rules limiting the imposition of the death penalty. These features of the
criminal justice system victimized the poor and disadvantaged. So too
did the welfare system which was administered in an arbitrary and op-
pressive manner. The capacity of the poor to participate in civic activities
was also limited by the imposition of poll taxes, court filing fees, and the
like. It was precisely these evils that the Warren Court, at the peak of its
powers, so readily and ably took on.3 7
34. 418 U.S. 717, 782 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35. FIss, supra note 4, at 26, 28.
36. Id. at 28.




Fiss credits the Court's success to Justice Brennan, its frequent spokesper-
son." His abilities as statesman and lawyer made him the consensus-builder
among the Justices and the Court's emissary to the profession. His opinions re-
flected "the vision that infused Brown" and inspired the young."' They also
showed Justice Brennan's understanding that the more Justices he could enlist
on an opinion, the greater authority the decision would command;40 his concern
that the Court speak authoritatively and effectively;4 1 his care to avoid confron-
tations with the executive branch and Congress;42 his command of the "vast
bodies of learning, ancient and modern";4 3 and his doctrinal dexterity. Justice
Brennan's clerks marveled at his intellect, quickness, warmth, and irresistibil-
ity.44 Though Audre Lorde warned that "the master's tools will never dismantle
the master's house,"45 Brennan used the tools of his trade to do just that.
But despite occasional victories after 1969, like Roe v. Wade4 6 and Bakke,47
Justice Brennan, like Justice Marshall, frequently found his colleagues immova-
ble. During his second life as Associate Justice, Brennan became the epicenter of
the resistance to the counterrevolution spearheaded by Justice, and later Chief
Justice, William Rehnquist.4 8 At law clerk gatherings, Justice Brennan would
"wryly announce the tally of his dissents" to cheers,4 9 but he reserved his pride
for the instances where he had "miraculously" patched together a majority to
save a bit of the Warren Court's handiwork.so
Save for such triumphs, many law professors and much of the legal profes-
sion perceived the Court "as an alien and hostile institution," increasingly in-
clined to protect the established order and demean its challengers." Fiss believes
38. Id. at 34-37.
39. Id. at 46.
40. Id. at 35.
41. Id. at 44.
42. Id. at 36.
43 Id.
44. Id. at 45.
45. Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in THIS BRIDGE
CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR 25 (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria
Anzaldua eds., 1983).
46. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
47. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
48. FIss, supra note 4, at 40-43.
49. Id. at 43.
50. Id. at 41.
51. Id. at 45.
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that this reaction contributed to the popularity of critical legal studies during the
1970s and 198os, as well as "the nihilism it propagated with the proclamation
that 'law is politics."'52 That estrangement also explains for Fiss why Justice
Brennan received more plaudits at his retirement than any Justice in history, ex-
cept perhaps Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.ss In celebrating Brennan, "people
were in part celebrating the liberal tradition that he helped to create and defend
and that now seemed increasingly imperiled."54 Yet Fiss remains committed to
the Court's potential and presses us to make Brennan our model. "He resisted,
tenaciously, and yet kept the faith -why can't we?
At the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division, where Fiss worked on
cases implementing school desegregation and the Voting Rights Act from 1966
to 1968,56 he encountered two other giants, Burke Marshall and John Doar. They
had the task of administering the "civil rights revolution," which was, he ex-
plains, "a most unusual, almost paradoxical revolution: a revolution by and
through the law."" The taciturn Robert Kennedy surprised many when he
tapped the equally laconic Marshall," a patrician Covington & Burling antitrust
partner, to head the Civil Rights Division. But the choice demonstrated how
force of character could transform an ordinary lawyer into a social justice war-
rior. Marshall filed scores of voting discrimination suits throughout the South
and negotiated an end to segregation in many communities.9 Occasionally, he
employed force to desegregate institutions, though his commitment to federal-
ism meant he did so less frequently than Fiss and other activists would have
liked.60 When Fiss and others nevertheless claimed Marshall s "our hero," their
paragon resisted.6 1 "A hero, according to Burke, is someone who does more than
one's duty, a person who acts in a way that no one has a right to expect or de-
mand. 62 Civil rights activists and lawyers who risked their lives did that; he
52. Id.
53. Id. at 31.
54. Id. at 41-
55. Id. at 47-
56. Id. at 5.
57. Id. at 49.
58. "Legend has it that ... neither [Marshall nor Kennedy] said a word for the first ten minutes
[during his job interview]." VICTORS. NAVASIcY, KENNEDYJUSTICE 161-62 (1971).
s9. Fiss, supra note 4, at 67.
6o. Id. at 66-67.





himself, his job.63 Fiss concludes that if Marshall was not a hero, "it was only
because he saw the profession of law in such heroic terms" and as "an emphati-
cally principled" endeavor.64
So did John Doar. This white Republican worked so hard and with such at-
tention to detail - "'Facts, facts, facts' was his mantra"6 - that he was absent
when his second son was born, and his third waited six weeks before he received
a name (Doar eventually chose "Burke").66 Doar's courage was remarkable and
repeated: He stood with James Meredith as he integrated the University of Mis-
sissippi, successfully prosecuted the murderers of civil rights workers, and su-
pervised the march from Selma. After police clubbed, set dogs on, and arrested
protestors enraged by the assassination of NAACP Field Secretary Medgar Evers,
some responded with bricks and bottles until Doar intervened. Facing the mob,
he proclaimed: "'My name is John Doar .. .. I am from the Department of Jus-
tice, and as anybody around here knows, I stand for what is right. Medgar Evers
would not want it this way."'67 Moved by the bravery that stemmed from Doar's
rectitude, the angry crowd dispersed.6 8
B. Sympathetic Colleagues in Hyde Park and Nirvana
Next to the likes of John Doar, law professors' lives might seem thin gruel,
but Fiss, who moved to the University of Chicago in 1968 and Yale in 1974, pro-
vides absorbing accounts of his supportive colleagues. He became an apprentice
to one of Chicago's few liberals, Harry Kalven, who possessed two qualities rare
among academics - authentic genius and a "sunny disposition."69 A wordsmith,
Kalven denigrated McCarthyism,70 demonstrated endless "faith in the capacity
63. Id. at 76.
64. Id. at 77.
65. Id. at 52.
66. Id. at 53.
67. Id. at 56.
68. Id. Pillars of Justice contains few source notes, and I confess to wondering whether this scene
unrolled as Fiss described. It did. TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE
KINGYEARS, 1954-1963, at 826-27 (1988); Claude Sitton, 27AreArrested in Jackson RiotsAfter
Evers Rite: Police Use Clubs and Dogs To Drive Back Negroes- U.S. Aide Calms Crowd, N.Y.
TiMEs, June 16, 1963, at 1.
69. Id. at 82, 87.
70. Id. at 84.
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of the law to work itself pure,"" defended "young turk" professors,72 and de-
lighted in students. "Can you imagine -a law professor of great scholarly dis-
tinction who truly loved students?" Fiss asks,' though he later says this descrip-
tion applies to himself as well.74
Yale was very different -liberal and quirkier. Fiss was first vetted for a job
there in 1966. "Your professors at Harvard say you belong at Yale. What do they
mean by that?" began one interviewer. Whether Fiss received an offer, he does
not say. He was lucky to spend the late sixties and early seventies elsewhere.
During that period- sometimes referred to by survivors as "The Dark Ages" or
"The Dark Years"76 -Yale became a most unhappy place. The students, alive
with concerns of the sixties, rebelled against the faculty,7 7 sometimes with the
support of the younger professors.7 ' The senior faculty denied tenure to most
juniors in what became known as "the slaughter of the innocents"
7 9 or "the
'bloodbath."o Many at Yale became demoralized. When Fiss arrived in New Ha-
ven in 1974, Alexander Bickel -Yale's most famous constitutional theorist-was
dying, and senior professors were retiring or jumping ship."
Nevertheless, Fiss fell in love with the place. With a convert's zeal,82 he pelted
deans with "fissiles" for the next forty years, "accusing them of betraying the
most sacred traditions of the school.""" To him, Dean Eugene Rostow, who led
the school through one of its periodic transformations between 1955 and 1965,
embodied Yale's virtues. Though Rostow had branded Korematsu v. United States
71. Id. at 89.
72. Id. at 87.
73. Id. at 85.
74. Id. at 193.
75. Id. at 19o.
76. Laura Kalman, The Dark Ages, in HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL: THE TERCENTENNIAL
LECTURES 154, 197 (Anthony T. Kronman ed., 2004).
77. LAURA KALMAN, YALE LAW SCHOOL AND THE SIXTIES: REVOLT AND REVERBERATIONS 68-97
(2005).
78. Id. at 261-66.
79. Id. at 234.
so. Id. at 314 (quoting Douglas Lavine, 'Has the Faculty Lost Its Fizz?' Yale Law: Fork in the Road,
NAT'L L.J., June 29, 1981, at 26-27).
81. FIss, supra note 4, at 110.
82. See id. at 94, 191.




"a disaster,"84 he always retained "faith in the Court as an instrument of public
reason." And, in contrast o Harvard, Yale "embraced" Brown.8 6 Under Rostow,
Fiss maintains, the school "emerged as a great national institution, a bastion of
the liberal tradition"" and "an academic law school."" Rostow's creative hiring
enabled Yale to thrive." He rebuilt and expanded the faculty by hiring dynamos
like Bickel, Charles Black, Robert Bork, Guido Calabresi, Ronald Dworkin,
Abraham Goldstein, Joseph Goldstein, Leon Lipson, Ellen Peters, Louis Pollak,
Charles Reich, and Harry Wellington.o The faculty Rostow hired "was as bril-
liant, diverse, and eclectic a group of legal scholars as has ever been gathered at
one law school in the country."" As Fiss muses in his essay on Joe Goldstein, Yale
also made the scholar "sovereign."92
Such an institution can only prevail if professors are good citizens, and Ar-
thur Leff was Yale's "finest."" When Fiss arrived at the battered school in 1974,
he was astonished to find Leff, one of its most brilliant and beloved members,
brewing coffee in the faculty lounge. That was just Leff's "modest way of ex-
pressing the central tenet of his theory of citizenship: the highest duty of the
citizen-scholar was to talk about ideas with others."94 So Leff wittily and wisely
did. He joined the Legal Theory Workshop that Fiss and Bruce Ackerman
launched. To maintain its emphasis on ideas, "it was never allowed to become
an adjunct to the appointments process." Only scholars not expected to pass
muster for a Yale appointment received invitations to present, and Leff "helped
establish the one law that governed the workshop, the law of inverse relation-
ship, which holds that the weaker the paper the better the discussion will be
84. Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases -A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 489-92 (1945);
see also Sarah H. Ludington, The Dogs That Did Not Bark: The Silence of the Legal Academy
During World War II, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 397, 398 (2011) (noting that Rostow was one of only
two tenured law professors to voice disapproval of internment during World War II).
85. FIss, supra note 4, at 7.
86. Id. at 91-92.
87. Id. at 93.
88. Id. at 94.
89. ICALMAN, supra note 77, at 48.
go. Id. at 49.
91. Douglas Lavine, 'Has the Faculty Lost Its Fizz?' Yale Law: Fork in the Road, NAT'L L.J., June 29,
1981, at 1.
92. FIss, supra note 4, at 129.
93. Id. at 113.
94. Id. at lo9-
95. Id. at 101.
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among those in the audience."9 6 He also tirelessly commented on others' drafts,
including "all thirty-two revisions of Bruce Ackerman's manuscript for SocialJus-
tice in the Liberal State."' He was the dream reader, rigorous but supportive."
Leff behaved this way because he knew that scholarship is "lonely," and prepub-
lication criticism an act of friendship and collegiality.99
Scholars like Ackerman and Fiss especially needed this companionship dur-
ing the 1970 s. They believed that " [t]he right of the judiciary to give meaning to
our public values" rested on "the processual norms that simultaneously constrain
and liberate those who exercise the judicial power."00 And they came to Yale at
just the moment that the Burger Court, law and economics, and critical legal
studies began menacing the hegemony of legal liberalism. Like Ackerman,101
Fiss condemned both movements for endangering the primacy of reason and
rejecting "law as a public ideal."1 02 Adherents of both schools, Fiss said, resisted
"a jurisprudence, confidently embraced by the bar in the sixties, that sees adju-
dication as the process for interpreting and nurturing a public morality"o and
did not deserve to participate in the process of defining law's norms. Law and
economics, with its emphasis on the efficiency of law, treated Brown and other
cases as "a conflict over preferences" and charged judges with "maximizing the
satisfaction of these conflicting preferences."1 04 Critical legal scholars reveled in
exposing law's "(to use their favorite term) 'indeterminacy"'"o and critiqued
simply to promote critique, 106 a "politically unappealing and politically irrespon-
sible" goal. o The victory of either movement would mean "the death of the law,
as we have known it throughout history, and as we have come to admire it."o
96. Id. at 11o.
97. Id. at iII.
98. Id.
99. Id.
ioo. Fiss, supra note 23, at 8.
101. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Law, Economics, and the Problem of Legal Culture, 1986 DuKE L.J.
929 (criticizing the Chicago school of law and economics and some strands of the critical legal
studies movement).
102. Fiss, supra note 23, at 2.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 8.
105. Id. at 9.
lo6. Id. at lo.
107. Id.




So no wonder that Leff witnessed a "growing, and apparently terrifying, re-
alization" gripping his colleagues as he made coffee - "that there cannot be any
normative system ultimately based on anything except human will." 0o' The
hopelessness of finding the objective foundations of justice that would make law
fair and impartial, he maintained in 1979, meant "everything is up for grabs."1 o
Leff famously continued:
Nevertheless:
Napalming babies is bad.
Starving the poor is wicked.
Buying and selling each other is depraved.
Those who stood up to and died resisting Hitler, Stalin, Amin, and Pol
Pot - and General Custer too -have earned salvation.
Those who acquiesced deserved to be damned.
There is in the world such a thing as evil.
[All together now:] Sez who?
God help us.1
C. Friendly Critics
Fiss saw Leff's "professed nihilism" as a pose "inconsistent with all that I
knew about him."112 But their colleague, Robert Cover, the eminent legal histo-
rian, definitely lost the faith, Fiss sadly acknowledges. Where Fiss celebrated the
anti-apartheid achievements of the federal courts because they grew out of mem-
bership in an interpretive community whose rules of adjudication bound and
disciplined the players, " Cover supported those achievements because they
suited his politics, and he wanted to see dissenters forced to knuckle under. He
publicly accused Fiss of living in the world of the 1967 Warren Court.114 More-
over, Cover claimed, by treating "the judiciary as a tribune of public reason, ca-
pable of giving means to the highest ideals of the nation,"" his friend refused
to recognize its coerciveness.116 Like all judges and Justices, Warren Burger was
og. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DuKEL.J. 1229,1229-30.
11o. Id. at 1249.
iii. Id.
112. FIss, supra note 4, at 114.
113. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 745, 762 (1982).
114. KALMAN, supra note 17, at 129-30.
115. FIss, supra note 4, at 159.
116. Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4,48 (1983).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
a man of violence, Cover contended. While he would play the game of taking
judicial mouthings seriously if it did any political good, the Warren Court was
gone and Cover saw no reason to promote its despised successor by portraying
Justices as sacred priests. The Justices' admirable commitments in Brown re-
flected their politics, and an opinion simply proclaiming an end to American
apartheid would have been just as good, if not better than the one the Court
produced."' To Fiss, Cover, like critical legal scholars, was destroying the dis-
tinction between law and politics"' and was "betraying" the Warren Court.1
The "romantic" moment when liberals could count on the federal courts had
passed, Cover countered, and was doomed to become "a memory of the sublime
sixties."120
Critical legal studies founder and venerable legal historian Morton Horwitz,
another longtime sparring partner, had become a buddy at Stuyvesant. Fiss
and Horwitz traveled to Washington together on that fateful trip to see
Thurgood Marshall. 121 For his part, Fiss placed his faith in the law and the
expectation that a discourse locating "fundamental values in the Constitution"
and tasking Justices with articulating governing principles would "discipline"
them and provide standards by which to judge them.122 Horwitz did not,123 and
their debate extends to Brown. For Fiss, Brown is law. Judicial review can only
be justified by "an appreciation of the role of the judiciary, as a nonmajoritarian
institution, to vindicate constitutional principles, including the guarantee of
equal protection."124 Brown embodied the antisubordination principle and "con-
demned ... any practice, even those that did not make distinctions based on
race, that perpetuated the hierarchy among racial groups and that, in particular,
subordinated Blacks."125 For Horwitz, Fiss says, Brown is history. It is "a form of
politics and, like any political event," depends on the past's "fortuities."1 2 6 Hor-
witz rescued Brown's legitimacy- but only by tying the case to the growth of
117. KAIMAN, supra note 17, at 129-30.
118. FIss, supra note 4, at 160.
iig. Id.; see also KALMAN, supra note 17, at 130.
120. FIss, supra note 4, at 161.
121. Id. at 163-64.
122. Id. at 173.
123. Id. at 169-70.
124. Id. at 168.
125. Id. at 120.




democracy as an ideal after World War 11.127 "In this way Horwitz saved Brown
but, I fear, lost the law," Fiss mourns.128
D. Legal Cosmopolitans
Faced with friends' doubts about Brown and the existence of objective foun-
dations of justice, Fiss looked to others outside the United States to enshrine
reason in law.129 In the mid-1980s, he began traveling to Argentina at the invi-
tation of Carlos Nino, a brilliant and exuberant analytical philosopher and public
intellectual. 0̀ Nino advised President Alfonsin during the reinstatement of de-
mocracy after the military junta's brutal dictatorship,"' developed Argentina's
human rights policies, and helped plan the first major war crimes trial since Nu-
remberg.13 2 The decision to prosecute the big fish who led the junta while letting
the smaller ones off the hook disappointed Nino.' Yet just as he played a piv-
otal role in restoring democracy, in its messiness, to Argentina, Nino worked to
bring it and constitutional reform to countless other countries. 134 Fiss loved
Nino, who held the position of visiting professor at Yale until his death,' "like
the brother [he] never had."13 6
Aharon Barak provided another source of inspiration and helped shape
Fiss's excoriation of the Roberts Court as the forum of antireason, given its inat-
tentiveness to the freedoms of speech, privacy, and due process during the War
127. Id. at 14, 166; Cf MORTON J. HORWITz, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE Xii
(1998) (arguing that during the Warren Court "[f]or the first time, democracy became the
foundational value in American constitutional discourse"); Morton Horwitz & Orlando do
Campo, When and How the Supreme Court Found Democracy-A Computer Study, 14 QUIN-
NIPIAC L. REv. 1 (1994) (documenting the Supreme Court's increasing use of the language of
democracy).
128. FIss, supra note 4, at 14.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 140.
131. Id. at 139-40.
132. Id. at 144-46.
133. Id. at 146. Sadly, Alfonsin's successor issued presidential pardons to the convicted big fish.
Carlos S. Nino, The Duty To Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put into Context: The Case of
Argentina, loo YALE L.J. 2619, 2630 (1991).
134. FIss, supra note 4, at 147.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 150.
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on Terror."' Fiss dedicated A War Like No Other to the legendary Barak,"' who
was spirited out of a Lithuanian ghetto during World War II as a youngster when
the Nazis resolved to murder all Jewish children,"' and who became a professor
and dean of the law faculty at Hebrew University, then justice and later President
of the Israeli Supreme Court. 140 A Brown fan and "a modern-day apostle of the
Enlightenment,"14 1 Barak created "a body of rulings [that] has become what
Brown once was - a beacon for all the world," Fiss writes. 142 His jurisprudence
aimed at protecting the human dignity of Israel's citizens and noncitizens that he
considers essential to democracy.143 in contrast to the American courts that caved
in Korematsu and have time and again deferred to the government when it cited
military necessity after 9/11,144 Barak claims it is the judiciary's duty to determine
the appropriate balance between civil liberties and national security.14 5 For Fiss,
Barak's belief that "'law is everywhere' . . . invite [s] us to imagine that every as-
pect of our public life, even war, can and should be governed by reason, and
reason alone."1 4 6
E. Students
Students mostly hearten Fiss too. He had not known many women law stu-
dents or lawyers or thought much about feminism, he says, before he met Cath-
arine MacKinnon in the 1970s. He had attended three all-male institutions -
Stuyvesant, Dartmouth, and University College, Oxford -and gone to Harvard
Law School when its dean declared that he restricted women's matriculation be-
cause they "were only looking for husbands" and would not practice law.147 Fiss
is ashamed of his and other male students' acceptance of such chauvinism.
137. See OWEN FIss, AWARLIKE No OTHER: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF TERROR (2015).
138. Id. at Dedication.
139. Fiss, supra note 4, at 175.
140. Id. at 175-76.
141. Id. at 14,186.
142. Id. at 14.
143. Id. at 180.
144. Id. at 183-85.
145. Id. at 182.
146. Id. at 186.
147. Id. at 117. For an account of the challenges faced by Fiss's women classmates, see JUDITH RICH-
ARDS HOPE, PINSTRIPES & PEARLS: THE WOMEN OF THE HARVARD LAw SCHOOL CLASS OF '64





" [W] e were living through a great social upheaval, maybe tantamount to a rev-
olution, inspired by a passion for equality-we were the children of Brown. How
could we - how could I - have remained silent in the face of practices that so
grossly offended the principle of equal treatment?"14 8
He credits the charismatic MacKinnon, then beginning her pioneer work re-
defining sex discrimination, with helping him to see the relationship between
racial and sexual inequality and between sexual inequality and free speech. Since
no course on feminism existed, acting "on the assumption - long part of the folk-
lore of Yale - that the best way to learn a subject was to teach it,"1 4 9 Fiss was soon
leading a seminar on feminist legal theory where MacKinnon's work provoked
debate. Once the discussion of sex became so charged that the women asked Fiss
and the only other male participant to leave.5 o ("We refused.""') Fiss himself
wondered about MacKinnon's "attack on the objectivity of the law."152 While he
acknowledged that law had discriminated against women, of course he did not
agree that it could never be objective.' In fact, he claims that "insofar as femi-
nism is presented as a program of legal or constitutional reform seeking to guar-
antee women equal protection- to extendBrown to women- it must presuppose
the fairness and impartiality of the law."154
Ultimately, however, MacKinnon and all his other students in the "Eden""
that is Yale provide Fiss a hedge against despair. His colleagues joke that students
are the best part of the place, but he recognizes the quip's "kernel of truth."1 56 He
considers his students his "proudest achievement,"1 7 and relies on them "to re-
alize [his] deepest dreams and hopes.""' For Fiss, "the golden age of American
law began on May 17, 1954, and continued until the mid-1970s, when a newly
constituted Supreme Court began its disheartening project of denying the re-
demptive possibilities and promise of Brown v. Board of Education."'5 9 He is cer-
tain in his "heart of hearts .. . that someday soon the golden age of American
148. FIss, supra note 4, at 118.
149. Id. at 121.
150. Id. at 122.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 124.
153. Id. at 125.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 189.
156. Id. at 192.
157. Id. at 193.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 194.
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law will once again come into being and will be carried on the shoulders of a new
generation, determined to turn the lessons they learned in the classroom into a
living truth."16 0 By situating his devotion to the Warren Court and "the golden
age of American law" in the context of his own life, Fiss has enabled us to un-
derstand why legal liberalism seemed such a revelation to him and why he clings
to it so tenaciously.
II. REFLECTIONS
This book is so good that it seems churlish to observe that a different one
could be written about the aging of Brown and the Warren Court, the history of
Yale, legal education, the future of legal liberalism, and the sacrifices involved.
Yet, it seems appropriate because Fiss so enjoys debating ideas. Fiss knows he
possesses the truth, and his affinity for absolutes makes him comfortable com-
manding what "we" should do and determining who deserves to participate in
the conversation without worrying that he seems arrogant. "How can it be that
he is such a good friend, sounding board and guide at the same time that he
remains so resolute, so adamant, in his rectitude[],"16 1 colleague Robert Burt
once mused. The answer, he suggested, lay in Fiss's "personal character, joined
with his intellectual commitment to equality."162 So while mine is a rave review,
I also question his quest-in the Fissian spirit.
A. The Aging of Brown and the Warren Court
We begin with Fiss's treatment of Brown and his affirmation that it sparked
the civil rights movement through its invocation of the antisubordination prin-
ciple. 163 In fact, historians of the South believe the civil rights revolution dates
back to the interwar period.1 64 Nor did Brown spark Martin Luther King's Mont-
gomery Bus Boycott. And where King sought to mobilize civil rights activists
through direct action, Thurgood Marshall trusted in the federal courts to end
160. Id.
161. Robert A. Burt, The Truth About Owen Fiss, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 83, 83 (2003).
162. Id. at 96.
163. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
164. See GLENDAELIZABETH GILMORE, DEFYING DIXIE, THE RADICAL ROOTS OF CIVIL RIGHTS: 1919-
1950 (2008); Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the




Montgomery's bus segregation and branded the boycott "street theater."16 s Yet
the reigning narrative still casts Brown as the cradle of change,166 even though
many academic lawyers aligned with liberalism and the left, including a number
of Fiss's students, have articulated their disappointment with Brown and the
Warren Court from different political and disciplinary perspectives. Fiss pays
these critics little attention.
As a fellow legal liberal, I am also tempted to gild the lily. Marshall's careful
design for victory in Brown provided the template for public interest litigation.
Thus Pauli Murray likened sex discrimination to racial discrimination during the
1960s and pushed the women's movement to emulate the NAACP's strategy.16 7
Thus Ruth Bader Ginsburg made Marshall's "step-by-step, incremental ap-
proach" her model when she litigated gender equality during the 1970s.1 6 8 Thus
gay rights advocates during the 196os relied on the race-sexuality analogy to sit-
uate themselves as a legal minority. 169 Thus Joe Biden called the Supreme Court's
2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges that the same-sex marriage bans violated the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses the "Brown v. Board of Education" of
the gay rights movement.170 No surprise, then, that Adam Liptak wrote in 20o6
that Brown remains law's "sacred text."1 7 1 While early Harvard-trained process
theorists argued that Brown deserved better justification, even they swallowed
their doubts to worship at Brown's shrine.172
165. CHARLES L. ZELDEN, THURGOOD MARSHALL: RACE, RIGHTS, AND THE STRUGGLE FORAMORE
PERFECT UNION 116-20 (2013); see HOWARD BALL, A DEFIANT LIFE: THURGOOD MARSHALL
AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACISM IN AMERICA 154-57 (1998).
166. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, N.Y. TIMES (May 16,2004), http://www.nytimes.com
/2004/05/16/opinion/brown-v-board-of-education.htm [http://perma.cc/YU58-HHXH].
167. Serena Mayeri, Note, 'A Common Fate of Discrimination": Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and
Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045, 1056-63 (2001).
168. Jeffrey Rosen, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Is an American Hero, NEw REPUBLIC (Sept. 28, 2014),
http://newrepublic.com/article/119578/ruth-bader-ginsburg-interview-retirement
-feminists-jazzercise [http://perma.cc/69E2-3JFK].
169. CraigJ. Konnoth, Note, Created in Its Image: TheRaceAnalogy, Gay Identity, and Gay Litigation
in the 1950s-1970s, 119 YALE L.J. 318, 340-41 (2009).
170. Jordan Fabian, Biden Compares Gay Marriage Ruling to 'Brown v. Board of Education,' HILL
(July 10, 2015), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/247482-biden-compares-gay
-marriage-ruling-to-brown-v-board-of-education [http://perma.cc/Q4L6-LG65].
171. Adam Liptak, Brown v. Board of Education, Second Round, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. io, 20o6),
http://www.nytimes.com/2oo6/12/10/weekinreview/loiptak.html [http://perma.cc
/8QMG-QYYJ].
172. KALMAN, supra note 17, at 30-36.
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So while Fiss's claim must sound strange to those growing up in our nonhe-
roic age, he rightly insists that Brown and the Warren Court inspired many (in-
cluding me) to enroll in law school during the 196os and 1970s when liberals
still dominated the legal academy. The Yale Law journal's editors observed that
Earl Warren "made us all proud to be lawyers,""' while their Harvard counter-
parts dedicated an issue to "Chief Justice Earl Warren, who with courage and
compassion led a reform of the law while the other branches of government de-
layed."174 The Warren Court convinced law students to see the federal courts as
the great engine of social change.17 1
Yet time has proven unkind to Fiss's triumphal history. Critical legal studies
and law and economics shattered the consensus in the legal academy. Neither the
author nor his pillars show much interest in law and economics, except as a dan-
ger,17 6 and Fiss's target audience is politically left of center. Perhaps a book meant
to inspire and instruct that group would have proved even more powerful had it
explored the doubts that developed about Brown and the Warren Court and ex-
plained why we should disregard skeptics.
Brown initially kindled hope for change. InJanuary 1954, Thurgood Marshall
predicted that school desegregation would occur in "four or five years,"1 7 7 and he
sounded positive even after the Court's declaration in Brown II that desegrega-
tion need only occur "with all deliberate speed."1 7 ("How the fuck do you have
'all deliberate speed?' There's a contradiction in those terms," a journalist recalled
him noting privately. 179) So, too, despite the lack of progress in integrating
Southern schools,1so Linda Brown said in 1964, "That decision carries my name,
173. Dedication, 84 YALE L.J. 405 (1975).
174. Archibald Cox, Chief Justice Earl Warren, 83 HARvL. REv. 1, 1 (1969).
175. J. Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARv. L.
REV. 769, 804 (1971).
176. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 905
(1980) (criticizing law and economics); Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some
Realism About Nominalism, 6o VA. L. REV. 451 (1974) (same). Nor did they or Fiss seem overly
interested in the progressive version of law and economics that was emerging in New Haven.
See generally Laura Kalman, Some ThoughtsAbout Yale and Guido, 7 7 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS
15 (2014).
177. Associated Press, 'Upheaval' Doubted if School Bias Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,1954, at 34.
178. 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955); see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.
BOARD OFEDUCATIONAND BLACK AMERICA's STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 746-48 (1987).
179. CARL RowAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: THE WORLD OF JUSTICE THURGOOD MAR-
SHALL 237 (1993).





and through this decision many of the people of my race were helped to obtain
better and equal opportunities." "' Even the attorney for Kansas eventually
sounded happy he lost the case,182 which journalist Anthony Lewis claimed in
1964 "launched 'the racial decade in America'- ten years of irreversible revolu-
tion in the pattern of Negro-white relations.""
And, by Fiss's move to Yale at Brown's twentieth anniversary, real progress
had occurred. Some conservatives had traded in talk that African American
Southerners "are, by comparison with the Whites, retarded"184 for the rhetoric
of colorblindness." Fiss recognized early that the right's claim that Brown em-
braced the antidiscrimination principle imperiled legal liberalism and its insist-
ence that the decision committed the state to battle subordination.18 6 But the
new language represented progress. By the mid-1970s, many also saw that
Brown and its progeny, along with civil rights legislation, had increased the
power of state institutions to defeat racial inequality.8
From there, it was downhill. By the time Brown turned twenty-five, Linda
Brown, now the parent of school-age children, was intervening in litigation chal-
lenging the continued Topeka school segregation.' Her case had not yet come
to trial by the time of the decision's thirtieth birthday,8 9 a somber occasion for
181. A.L., The Brown Case, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May lo, 1964, at 93.
182. Paul E. Wilson, Brown v. Board of Education Revisited, 12 U. ICAN. L. REV. 507, 523-24 (1964).
183. Anthony Lewis, Since the Supreme Court Spoke, N.Y. TIMES MAG, May lo, 1964, at 9; see also
Relman Morin, School Desegregation: ALook at Past lo Years, L.A. TIMES, May 17, 1964, at E6.
184. Ben DiMiero, National Review's Ugly Civil Rights History: Conservative Magazine Tries To
Re-Appropriate the Civil Rights Movement, MEDIA MATTERS (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www
.mediamatters.org/blog/2013/o8/28/national-reviews-ugly-civil-rights-history/195638
[http://perma.cc/NVR6-FDM7].
185. NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM Is NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE
235 (2005).
186. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 172-73 (1976);
cf Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 864 (2007) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (explaining that since Brown, "the law has consistently and unequivocally ap-
proved of both voluntary and compulsory race-conscious measures to combat segregated
schools").
187. Burt Neuborne, The Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren Court, 2010 S. CT. REV. 59, 90
(2010).
188. Brown v. Board of Education, 84 F.R.D. 386 (D. Kan. 1979); Topeka Case Still Alive, N.Y.
TIMES, May 17, 1984, at B18; This Time It'sBrown's Daughter Versus the Board ofEducation, ST.
LouIs POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 31, 1989, at 7D.
18g. RAYMOND WALTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN: THIRTY YEARS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 273
(1984) (" [I]ntegration has been a failure in four of the five Brown school districts."); Walter
Goodman, Brown v. Board of Education: Uneven Results 30 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,
1984, at B18.
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civil rights activists.190 She had lost at the district level by Brown's thirty-fifth. 91
By its fortieth, Linda Brown had prevailed at the Tenth Circuit, where a majority
ruled that "there is a current condition of segregation in Topeka ... causally con-
nected to the prior de jure system of segregation."192 But by that point, the dis-
enchantment with his landmark decision probably had Earl Warren spinning in
his grave - or, perhaps, glumly walking around Heaven "with all deliberate
speed."93
Leave aside the resegregation that a more conservative Court had permitted,
even encouraged, since the mid-1970s,1 94 and focus on the original decision it-
self. One did not need to be a process theorist to find Brown fuzzy. Did it make
school segregation or, as the Court subsequently seemed to suggest without ex-
planation,95 all segregation unconstitutional? Did it put an end to legally en-
forced segregation or require integration?19 6
By the 198os and 199os, moreover, white critical legal scholars less sympa-
thetic to Brown than Horwitz charged that it underscored the peril of the rights-
consciousness it promoted. Until then, in a rare instance of accord, liberals and
the more radical left both largely cheered the Warren Court. 197 Now the left lam-
basted it for providing the underclass big promises and little protection. So what
if the Warren Court launched the rights revolution? "Rights are indeterminate,
190. Jacqueline Trescott, Unfinished Business: Marking an Anniversary at the NAACP Fund Dinner,
WASH. POST, May 18, 1984, at Bi. "I knew we had problems ahead,' Marshall said of Brown
to Carl Rowan in 1986, "but I sure as hell never imagined we'd get to this sad state of affairs."
ROwAN, supra note 179, at 250.
191. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 671 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Kan. 1987).
192. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 8 92 F.2d. 851, 886 (loth Cir. 1989).
193. See William Celis 3d, Forty Years After Brown, Segregation Persists, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 1994),
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/o5/18/us/40 -years-after-brown-segregation-persists.html
[http://perma.cc/4JXE-DZ36].
194. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public Education: The
Courts'Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597 (2003).
195. KIUGER, supra note 178, at 750-51 (1987).
196. See LUCAs A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 294-98 (2000) (dis-
cussing the Supreme Court's careful distinction between the two and choice of wording in its
opinion).
197. See Joan Roelofs, The Warren Court and Corporate Capitalism, 39 TELOS 94, 94 (1979) ("Con-
temporary left-wing critics of American institutions either ignore the Supreme Court, or ac-
cept the liberal view of it. That view, particularly as applied to the Court during Warren's
Chief Justiceship (1953-1969), is that the Court was benign, that it acted as a counterweight
to oppressive measures of the 'political' branches, that it did not participate in 'cold war' pol-
icies, that its major decisions had nothing to do with economic developments, and that its




rights limit our imaginations, rights inhibit political and social change,""' con-
tended critical legal scholars. The emphasis on individual rights favored proce-
dure over substance, served as a pressure valve permitting injustice, damaged
the development of community, and prevented transformative social change.
The legal system awarded an occasional victory like Brown, then handed down a
Brown IIdeferring exercise of the right."' Perhaps Brown itself was no win. Since
making "separate but equal" truly equal proved costly, the Court preserved the
status quo and deprived African Americans of "just cause for complaint" by rul-
ing separate unequal.2 00
Consequently, when Fiss discussed the "we" who "undertook the Second Re-
construction and tried to build the Great Society," derogated critical legal schol-
ars and others who made all normative issues subjective,2 01 and declaimed the
duty of all to follow the Warren Court in using law to shape equality and public
morality,202 critical legal scholars and postmodernists proved unmoved.20 3 Some
derogated his use of the constitutive "we" and scorned Fiss for ignoring the ex-
tent to which the individual, law, and truth were socially and culturally con-
structed. Critical legal scholar and feminist Clare Dalton, for example, shunned
his invitation "to join his community of faith" as long as she used "his prayer
book" at worship.204 Fiss's "authoritarian strategy . .. is attempting to force us
to relive the past . . . and not just the past, but his past as The Law,"205 griped one
postmodernist who sought to bury normativity.206
198. William W. Fisher III, The Development ofModern American Legal Theory and the Judicial Inter-
pretation of the Bill of Rights, in A CULTURE OF RIGHTS: THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN PHILOSOPHY,
POLITICS, AND LAw- 1791 AND 1991, at 266, 294 (Michael J. Lacey & Knud Haakonssen eds.,
1992).
199. Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049,1057 (1978).
200. Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, so CALIF. L. REV. 673, 717 (1992).
201. Fiss, supra note 23, at 15.
202. Id.
203. For a discussion of the relationship between critical legal studies and postmodernism, see
GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAWAND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY's END
126 (1995).
204. Clare Dalton, The Faithful Liberal and the Question of Diversity, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 7
(1989).
205. Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1677 (1991); see also Louis Mi-
chael Seidman, J. Skelly Wright and the Limits of Legal Liberalism, 61 LOYOLA L. REV. 69, 89
(2015) (pointing out the "unacceptably authoritarian" nature of legal liberalism to its critics).
2o6. See Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991).
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Also left unmentioned by Fiss is that by the 199os, many African Americans
doubted Brown. To be sure, some critical race theorists like Patricia Williams af-
firmed the value of rights, and implicitly, Brown.207 Others, however, claimed
that integration just deepened antagonism between the races because, as Alex
Johnson said, Brown "fails to acknowledge the existence of a unique African-
American community with its own nomos and values."208 Critical race theorist
and former NAACP lawyer Derrick Bell came to recognize law's inability and
refusal to erase racism.2 09 School desegregation devastated black administrators,
teachers, schools, and communities, some now contended.2 10 justice Clarence
Thomas wrote that Brown's suggestion that "black students suffer an unspecified
psychological harm from segregation" reflected "an assumption of black inferi-
ority."2 11 Meanwhile, after braving white mobs to desegregate Central High
School in Little Rock and prompting the litigation leading to Cooper v. Aaron,212
Elizabeth Eckford announced she no longer believed "integration was one of the
most desired things" and appreciated her "blackness" now.2 13 Little Rock police
shot and killed her son, Erin.214 At fifty-one, Linda Brown now admitted she was
disheartened and tired.215
So, too, we do not hear from Fiss that legal historians piled on as Brown's
fortieth birthday neared. Civil rights reform was Cold War policy, maintained
207. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. REV. 401, 431 (1987) ("'Rights' feels so new in the mouths of most black people.").
2o8. Alex Johnson, Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice: Why Integrationism Fails African-
Americans Again, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1401, 1403 (1993).
209. Compare DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987) (arguing that African Americans
must continue to press the courts for relief), with DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF
THE WELL (1993) (recognizing law's inability and refusal to erase racism).
210. DAVID S. CECELSKI, ALONG FREEDOM ROAD: HYDE COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA AND THE FATE
OF BLACK SCHOOLS IN THE SOUTH 15 (1994).
211. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
212. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
213. JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS
TROUBLED LEGACY 208 (2002).
214. David Margolick, Through a Lens, Darkly, VANITY FAIR (Sept. 2007), http://www.vanityfair
.com/news/2007/09/littlerock2oo7o9 [http://perma.cc/5YG7-ETY7]; Associated Press, Son
of a Civil Rights Trailblazer is Killed, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com
/2003/jan/03/nation/na-littlerock3 [http://perma.cc/M73Q-U2FV].






his former student,2 16 legal historian Mary Dudziak.2 17 Brown reflected liberals'
realization that racism undermined America's anticommunist crusade and dem-
ocratic pretensions,2 18 and the forces that made Brown possible meant that the
image of change proved more important than reality.2 19 Michael Klarman con-
tended that Brown halted the mellowing of race relations in the South and hard-
ened white resistance.220 Given such dour evaluations and the sense that it had
received quite enough attention already, other legal historians of the civil rights
movement began moving beyond Brown.2 21
216. Email from Mary Dudziak, Asa Griggs Candler Professor of Law, Emory Univ. Sch. of Law,
to author (Aug. 25, 2017, 9:05:10 PM PDT) (on file with author).
217. Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61 (1988) [herein-
after Dudziak, Desegregation]; MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE
IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000) [hereinafter DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS].
218. Dudziak, Desegregation, supra note 217, at 65-70, 73-113.
219. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 217, 11, 104; Dudziak, Desegregation, supra note
217, at 118-19. Other historians in the twenty-first century would demonstrate how the Cold
War limited the options of civil rights lawyers. Kenneth Mack has shown how Thurgood
Marshall and others rewrote the NAACP's history in the context of the Cold War and Brown
to say that the eyes had always been on the school desegregation prize. Kenneth W. Mack,
Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256, 268-
69 (2005). Risa Goluboff demonstrated that in the fifteen years before Brown, "the world of
civil rights was conceptually, doctrinally, and constitutionally, up for grabs." Risa L. Goluboff,
THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 5 (2007). That world included workers' rights and chal-
lenges to state-supported private segregation. According to Goluboff, however, after World
War II ended, the anticommunist climate of the Cold War, their own relative indifference to
economic inequality, and other factors sent NAACP lawyers off on an "increasingly single-
minded" drive to topple state-mandated segregation that resulted in the "marginalization" of
cases involving African American industrial workers. Id. at 218, 227. But see SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE
WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEw DEAL TO THE NEwRIGHT 135-54 (2014) (arguing,
as another former Fiss student, that the NAACP's labor constitutionalism remained intact
during the 1960s and led to a paradigmatic victory in NLRB case law against racialized eco-
nomic oppression in Hughes Tool, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964)); Sophia Z. Lee, Hotspots in a Cold
War: The NAACP's Postwar Workplace Constitutionalism, 1948-1964, 26 L. & HIST. REV. 327
(2008); Email from Sophia Lee, Professor of Law and History, Univ. Penn. Law Sch., to au-
thor (Aug. 25, 2017, 9:52:11 AM PDT) (on file with author).
220. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, So VA. L. REV. 7
(1994); Michael J. Klarman, Civil Rights Law: Who Made It and How Much Did It Matter, 83
GEO. L.J. 433 (1994); Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash
Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994).
221. Risa L. Goluboff, Lawyers, Law, and the New Civil Rights History, 126 HARv. L. REV. 2312 (2013).
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Meanwhile, political scientist Gerald Rosenberg contended that Brown did
nothing positive at all. Why did lawyers cling to their "endless attempt to can-
onize"222 it and ignore fruitful ways of achieving change, like involvement in
electoral politics and grassroots mobilization?2 23 In The Hollow Hope: Can Courts
Bring About Social Change?, Rosenberg presented data to argue that they "sel-
dom" could.224 As he acknowledged, that was a tough sale to make to law pro-
fessors.22 5 Some professors, including Fiss, ignored the noise and continued
lighting candles to the Warren Court, legal liberalism, and judicial activism as
the decision entered its fifth and sixth decades.22 6
Some, but by no means all. When Fiss's colleague, Jack Balkin, asked "the
nation's top legal experts" to rewrite Brown close to its fiftieth anniversary, all
revised it substantially.22 7 One would expect nothing less from law professors,
but the eagerness to tamper with "sacred text" proved striking.22 8 And although
former NAACP Chairman Julian Bond insisted that Brown was "the cause for
sober celebration, not impotent dismay,"229 Charles Ogletree concluded that "the
important goal of full equality in education following slavery and Jim Crow seg-
regation was compromised from the beginning." 230 Lani Guinier similarly
grieved that the brilliant Brown lawyers proved "unable to kindle a populist rev-
olution" that taught Americans racism was evil.23 1 Perhaps instead of focusing
on ending de jure school segregation, Marshall and the Supreme Court should
222. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Brown Is Dead! Long Live Brown!: The Endless Attempt To Canonize a
Case, So VA. L. REV. 161 (1994).
223. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOwHOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SocIAL CHANGE? 343
(1991).
224. Id. at 341.
225. "That old dead horse of judicial efficacy rears up with a vengeance that is sometimes quite
frightening." Gerald N. Rosenberg, Hollow Hopes and Other Aspirations: A Reply to Feeley and
McCann, 17 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 761, 776 (1992).
226. See, e.g., JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS
FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 187 (1994) (calling Brown "the most important
Supreme Court decision of the century, maybe ever"); Richard Sobel, A Colloquy with Jack
Greenberg About Brown: Experiences and Reflections 14 CONST. COMMENT. 347, 362-63 (1997)
(denouncing Rosenberg's "preposterous" attempt to discredit judicial activism).
227. WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OFEDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 34 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2002).
228. See supra text accompanying note 171.
229. Julian Bond, With All Deliberate Speed: Brown v. Board of Education, 90 IND. L.J. 1671, 1672
(2013).
230. CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF-CEN-
TURY OFBROWNV. BOARD OFEDUCATIONxV, 307 (2004).
231. Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of Education and the




have devoted their energies to making separate education for African Americans
genuinely equal to that provided to whites,232 or focused on eradicating the
state-sponsored residential segregation that existed throughout the United
States.233
Fiss also neglects the broader critique of the Warren Court emerging by the
twenty-first century. Consider criminal procedure and sex discrimination. Even
had its successors not gutted Miranda234 and Mapp,235 the Warren Court's at-
tempts to reduce the gulf between rich and poor defendants increased the divide,
according to William Stuntz.23 6 Its efforts launched an army of diligent but over-
worked public defenders who relegated indigent clients, a disproportionate
number of whom were black or brown, to "prison America"23 7 by prompting
them to accept guilty pleas that reduced the period of their incarceration instead
of fighting for acquittals.238 In focusing on regulating police behavior and crim-
inal procedure instead of substantive criminal law, the Warren Court made crim-
inal trials "more elaborate."239 The rush toward plea bargaining, however, which
232. DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFILLED
HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 21-27 (2004); Irving L. Joyner, Pimping Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation: The Destruction ofAfrican-American Schools and the Mis-Education ofAfrican-American
Students, 35 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 16o, 185-200 (2013).
233. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAw: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF How OUR GOVERN-
MENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 242 (2017).
234. Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 436 (1966) (creating a police duty to inform suspects in custody
of their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to
counsel); see, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (justifying an exception to the
duty to provide Miranda warnings where a defendant is a threat to public safety); North Car-
olina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (establishing that there is no need for express written or
oral waiver of a suspect's Miranda rights); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (allowing
the use of confessions obtained without Miranda warnings to impeach defendants who take
the stand in their own defense).
235. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (establishing that evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures must be excluded
from state criminal law prosecutions); see, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009)
(establishing that the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule applies when police error
is the result of isolated negligence); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (establishing a
"special needs" exception to the protection against warrantless searches); United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (establishing a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule).
236. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 218 (2011); see, e.g., Sara
Mayeux, What Gideon Did, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 15 (2016); Anders Walker, "To Corral and
Control the Ghetto": Stop, Frisk, and the Geography ofFreedom, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 1223 (2014).
237. NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: How LIBERALS BUILT PRISON AMERICA (2014).
238. GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA
194-204 (2003).
239. STUNTZ, supra note 236, at 236.
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it largely ignored,240 and which the Burger Court promoted,2 41 made trials less
frequent.242 The Warren Court's concentration on policing the police also made
crime a political flashpoint and prompted legislators competing for the "tough
on crime" moniker to define crimes and sentences more punitively to cause the
mass incarceration of people of color and the poor.243
Further, as Justin Driver noted, the Warren Court sometimes demonstrated
a constitutional conservatism that liberals overlooked.244 In the realm of sex dis-
crimination, it handed down Hoyt v. Florida,24 5 holding that a state statute auto-
matically exempting women from juries did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause. Given Brown, feminists made a smart strategic decision to litigate sex
discrimination by analogizing it to racial discrimination.24 6 But Fiss's student,
Serena Mayeri, showed that, at the same time Fiss was meeting MacKinnon in
the mid-1970s, the troubled economy and rise of conservatism were exposing
the limitations of the race-sex analogy.2 4 7 It turned out hat in key decisions, like
Geduldig v. Aiello248 and Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,249 the
Court used the race-sex analogy to women's disadvantage.2 50 And though Fiss
counts Roe and Bakke as partial wins,251 the courtroom successes of abortion and
affirmative action contributed to bacldashes against both.2 52
24o. But see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (insisting, at least, that the plea be voluntary);
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (striking down the death penalty clause of the
Federal Kidnapping Act because it encouraged guilty pleas). See generally Comment, The Un-
constitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1387 (1970).
241. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND THE RISE OF THE JUDI-
CIAL RIGHT 57-58 (2016).
242. See William J. Stunrz, The Political Constitution of Criminaljustice, 119 HARv. L. REV. 781, 816-
17(2o6).
243. See William J. Stuntz, UnequalJustice, 121 HARv. L. REV. 1969, 20o6-07 (2008).
244. Justin Driver, The Constitutional Conservatism of the Warren Court, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1101
(2012).
245. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
246. SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLU-
TION 105 (2011).
247. Id. at 1o5; Email from Serena Mayeri, Professor of Law and History, Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., to
author (Oct. io, 2017 2:44:19 PM PDT) (on file with author).
248. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
249. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
250. See MAYERI, supra note 246 at 95, 141.
251. They "survive by the narrowest of margins" and "define the outer limits of the law, without
generative power of their own." Fiss, supra note 4, at 41.





These trends raised the question of whether elying on the federal courts to
achieve social change was in fact a good strategy - or made sense only when Con-
gress and the President saw themselves as the judiciary's partners and the Court's
work reflected majority will. Indeed, borrowing from political scientists, some
scholars in the twenty-first century argued that Fiss and other cheerleaders got
it wrong. The Warren Court was not nonmajoritarian or countermajoritarian,
but majoritarian and possessed substantial support.25 3
Although Fiss shows some awareness of this possibility,254 he suggests that
"in 1968, history took a new turn"2 55 and conservatism triumphed when the
Senate thumbed its nose at the Court by rejecting LBJ's nomination of liberal
Justice Abe Fortas as Chief Justice. Thus Nixon was able to name Warren's uc-
cessor, a disaster for legal liberalism, given the Burger Court's "crucial role in
establishing the conservative legal foundation for the even more conservative
Courts that followed."25 6 But that implies the inevitability of Chief Justice War-
ren Burger, when in fact, many - and crucially, many in the Senate - still backed
the Warren Court and legal liberalism. Fortas was vulnerable, not just because
he sided with the Warren majority, but because of his role as presidential adviser
from the bench and his financial indiscretion.25 7 Had LBJ nominated Brennan
or another liberal instead of Fortas, confirmation might have occurred,258 Nixon
might have had but three vacancies, and constitutional law might have followed
a liberal direction longer. Talk about lost opportunities!
/4SB8-3FB6]; David Lauter, Affirmative Action Split the U.S. and the Courts, L.A. TIMES (Dec.
15, 1999), http://articles.latimes.com/1999/dec/15/local/me-4416o [http://perma.cc/KCG99
-XXMN]. But see Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New
Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L. J. 2028, 2034 (2011) (challenging accepted wisdom that
Roe v. Wade is "the sole and sufficient cause of political polarization around abortion").
253. See, for example, Thomas M. Keck, Party Politics or Judicial Independence? The Regime Politics
Literature Hits the Law Schools, 32 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 511 (2007), which responds to Robert A.
Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB.
L. 279 (1957).
254. FIss, supra note 4, at 33 ("At critical junctures [the Warren Court] looked to the executive and
legislative branches for support.... Yet it is also true that the Warren Court spurred the great
changes of the period.").
255. Fiss, supra note 4, at 37.
256. GRAETZ & GREENHOUSE, supra note 241, at 344.
257. LAURA IAN, THE LONG REACH OF THE SIXTIES: LBJ, NIXON, AND THE MAKING OF THE CON-
TEMPORARY SUPREME COURT 148-50,166-68 (2017).
258. Id. at 177-79, 312.
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B. Yale Law School
If Brown, the Warren Court, and legal liberalism are close to Fiss's heart, so
too, of course, is Yale. In this Section, I query his version of the school's history,
beginning with his dismissal of legal realism and his claim that Eugene Rostow
made the modern school "a bastion of the liberal tradition."2 59 I also question his
vision of legal education.
1. Legal Realism at Yale
Oddly, "legal realism" receives just one mention in Pillars of Justice, where
Fiss writes it off as a "school of thought that advanced the unremarkable propo-
sition that judges are people and are subject to the same impulses that govern all
of us."2 6 0 By dismissing realism, whose history and impact on Yale and the legal
academy I briefly summarize, Fiss skews Yale's and legal liberalism's histories.
Admittedly, I have a dog in this fight because I have written two books about
Yale that place legal realism at the core of its identity,261 but to think of Yale with-
out legal realism is akin to imagining Harvard without process theory.
Fiss's dismissal of legal realism is also strange because law professors tend to
treat realism as the jurisprudential divide between the old order and modernity.
Adopting a "generous" definition of legal realism,2 62 academics describe as "re-
alist" anyone who participated in undermining classical legal thought2 63 by de-
veloping "a more philosophically and politically enlightened jurisprudence."2 64
Thus Holmes marked himself a legal realist when he proclaimed that " [t] he life
of the law has not been logic: it has been experience"2 65 and pilloried Harvard's
Christopher Columbus Langdell as "the greatest living legal theologian," whose
"ideal in the law, the end of all his striving, is the elegantia juris, or logical integ-
rity of the system as system.2 66 (Langdell had declared law a science and that all
259. FIss, supra note 4, at 93.
260. Id. at 20.
261. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 98-144 (1986) [hereinafter
IKLMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE]; ILMAN, supra note 77, at 19.
262. AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, at xiii (William W. Fisher III et al. eds 1993).
263. See, e.g., id.; MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1870-1960, at
169-70,182-85 (1992); DUNCAN IENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT,
at ix-xxvi (20o6).
264. AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 262, at xiv.
265. OLIVERWENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881).




available materials of that science were contained in printed books;26 7 then, as
dean of Harvard, he turned students towards a close reading of appellate opin-
ions that forced them to derive a few fundamental rules, principles, and concepts
that the clever lawyer and judge could reconcile.268) The realists also encom-
passed sociological jurisprudents during the early twentieth century like Roscoe
Pound and Felix Frankfurter of Harvard, Benjamin Cardozo, and Louis
Brandeis.26 9 This camp further includes those who labeled themselves realists
during the movement's heyday in the late 1920s and 1930 S.2 7 0 Seen in this broad
way, realism set the agenda for modern legal thought.2 7 1
Whether or not you accept this big tent definition of legal realism,2 72 it was
not jurisprudentially distinctive. Well before the realists, Pound urged lawyers
to switch their focus from law in books to law in action,2 73 the effects of legal
doctrine and the social sciences illuminating them, in his famous - and unorigi-
nal274 - call for the proto-realism he named sociological jurisprudence.2 75 But in
a turnabout,2 76 Pound made every effort to keep sociological jurisprudence from
tainting legal education when he served as Harvard Law dean from 1916 to
19 36.277 At the same time, the prospect of legal certainty dwindled as an intellec-
tual revolution against abstraction after Darwin's discovery of evolution shifted
267. CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS, at vi
(1871).
268. BRUCE KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: C.C. LANGDELL,
1826-1906, at 193, 204-05 (2005).
269. HORWITZ, supra note 263, at 169-70.
270. Even then, who the realists are is a subject of contention. N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND &
KARLLLEWELLYN: SEARCHINGFORANAMERICANJURISPRUDENCE178-217,343-46 (1997).
271. NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 65 (1995) (contrasting its unparal-
leled influence with the "indeterminacy of its conceptual and thematic boundaries").
272. Not all 1920s and 1930s realists would have done so. Id. at 76-77 (underlining the insistence
of realists, in particular Llewellyn, in separating their intellectual enterprise from that of fore-
runners such as Justices Holmes and Cardozo).
273. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 20 (1910) (critiquing the
insistence on legal formalism and underlining the need for judicial discretion and flexibility).
274. HULL, supra note 270, at 78 (noting the variety of sources from which Pound formed his soci-
ological approach); see also DUXBURY, supra note 271, at 54-58 (cataloging the influences on
Pound's critique of legal formalism).
275. Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of SociologicalJurisprudence (pt. 1), 24 HARV. L. REv. 591,
594 (1911); see also Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of SociologicalJurisprudence (pt. 3), 25
HARv. L. REv. 489, 489 (1912).
276. DUXBURY, supra note 271, at 62.
277. See KALMAN, supra note 17, at 45-61 (recounting tensions at Harvard Law School during this
period).
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the spotlight from the study of structure to operations, or function,2 78 and liti-
gation exploded, along with the casebooks revealing a welter of conflicting prec-
edents.2 79
Enter the Yale realists to ride to the rescue, which makes Fiss's minimization
of their work all the more confusing. After promising beginnings at Columbia2 80
and Johns Hopkins petered out,281 Yale led the charge. Taking the helm in 1927,
twenty-seven-year-old Dean Robert Maynard Hutchins launched Yale's venture
into realism - and product differentiation. He hired three professors without law
degrees - a psychologist, a political scientist, and an economist - and announced
that faculty and students would engage in interdisciplinary scholarship.282 Stuck
in a backwater between two great law schools in two great cities, he had to do
something to win attention for Yale.
Hutchins's successor, Charles Clark, who steered the law school through the
1930s while drafting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, inherited and added
to a marquee of figures who gave the school its identity. Call the roll of professors
ranked as realists during the 1920s and 1930s, and you find many at Yale, in ad-
dition to Clark and Hutchins: Thurman Arnold, Walter Wheeler Cook, William
0. Douglas, Abe Fortas, Jerome Frank, Leon Green, Walton Hamilton, Karl
Llewellyn, Underhill Moore, Wesley Sturges, and Leon Tulin. All legal realism
required was the visibility it received when Frank attacked the fruitless search for
legal certainty by Pound and his fellow Harvardian, Joseph Beale, in the contro-
versial 1930 book, Law and the Modern Mind.283 Meanwhile, Llewellyn asserted
that "'sociological jurisprudence' remains bare of most of that [which] is signif-
icant in sociology."284 Given the pettiness of academic politics, the charges and
countercharges between Pound and the realists escalated until Llewellyn and
Frank read what had come before out of the canon and spawned a false sense of
rupture between the realists and their intellectual progenitors.28 5
278. Id. at 15-17 (sketching the move away from structuralism to functionalism in the 1920s).
279. Id. at 17.
28o. JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., AHISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAw: COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 300-03 (1955);
see also Brainerd Currie, The Materials of Law Study, 8 J. LEGAL ED. 1, 2 (1955) (pt. 3).
281. JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 147-210
(1995).
282. KALMAN, supra note 17, at 105-12.
283. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 4-5 (6th prtg. 2009) (taking aim at Roscoe
Pound's "patently superficial" response to popular skepticism of legal practice).
284. Karl Llewellyn,A RealisticJurisprudence - The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431,435 n-3 (1930).




Irreverence and impertinence pervaded the realist corpus during the 1930s.
Langdell and Harvard proved irresistible targets; "Pound-pounding,"28 6 an in-
door sport. Realists condemned the American Law Institute's Restatement,
which worked to lessen legal uncertainty by clearly and simply restating the law
and its correct principles.2 87 Many of its authors were Harvard professors, in-
cluding Beale, who reduced the field of conflicts to the principles of vested rights
and territoriality.2 88 The realists mocked him in doggerel and with neologisms
("ibealistic," "Bealy-mouthed").289 The realists made scholarship fun-if you
were not their quarry.
But legal realism at Yale had a serious side. It sought to increase law's pre-
dictability by acknowledging that legal rules and principles, as traditionally de-
rived by the Restatement's authors and others, did not guarantee legal certainty,
and by demonstrating how those rules and principles actually took shape.2 90 By
highlighting the role of human idiosyncrasy in judicial decision making, focus-
ing on factual context, and borrowing from the social sciences, most realists
hoped to make law a more predictable, efficient policy tool.291 They distin-
guished between the judge's decision about a case and his opinion, which they
sometimes treated as its rationalization.2 92 They preached functionalism and the
classification of doctrines, rules, principles, and concepts by factual context.2 93 A
realist scholar, for example, might observe that in contractual disputes, whether
the activity involved building a house or providing services routinely affected the
judicial determination of whether substantial performance had occurred. 294
Classification according to facts, then, could restore order from chaos and make
286. Stephen Presser, Revising the Conservative Tradition: TowardsA New American Legal History, 52
N.Y.U. L. REV. 700, 712 n.29 (1977).
287. G. Edward White, The American Law Institute and the Triumph of ModernistJurisprudence, 15 L.
& HIST. REV. 1, 6-10, 21-24, 46 (1997); see also ICALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, supra note
261, 25-28 (reviewing the various critiques at Yale, which was "recognized ... as the center of
opposition to the restatement").
288. JOSEPH HENRY BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS OR PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1916).
289. ICALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, supra note 261, at 25-26.
290. Thurman W. Arnold, Criminal Attempts-The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, 40 YALE L.J. 53,
57-58 (1930).
291. Not all realists were reformers, but most were, though some left the impression they did not
care much about anything. See IKuMAN, LEGAL REALISMAT YALE, supra note 261, at 20-21.
292. See, e.g,, Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decisions: Or How Judges Think, 11 ABAJ. 357, 359
(1925).
293. See, e.g., I(ALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, supra note 261, at 22-24, 29-31; Arnold, supra note
290, at 57-58.
294. Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 151 (1928).
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the future course of law clearer. In emphasizing factual context as well as legal
concepts, realists created a new legal geography.2 95
Once they saw the notion of a rational man operating in a free market ruled
by an invisible hand was fantasy, confronting the myth of laissez-faire and real-
izing private law was public law logically followed.2 96 The realists' assault on the
boundary between public and private was part and parcel of their functionalism,
and grew from their concern with marketplace operations.29 7 Private law inter-
ested them more than it did Frankfurter and other predecessors,29 and in ob-
serving that coercion is at the heart of all bargains, public or private, realists also
transformed the distinction between public and private into a continuum.2 99 The
use of institutional economics by Columbia's Robert Hale and Yale's Walton
Hamilton to shatter this distinction pointed to another realist goal that would
haunt Yale Law School and legal scholarship: "integrating" law with the social
sciences and enlisting interdisciplinarity in making law a policy tool. 00 Hutchins
and Clark used such empirical methods to discover "the actual operation of the
law" and to justify the school's smallness and selectiveness."o1
Pace Fiss, then, realists pointed to the role idiosyncrasy sometimes played in
decision making, preached that factual context was as important as legal doc-
trine, and promoted the social sciences. Their jurisprudential program should
have caused no consternation among lawyers and judges who had lapped up
Pound, Brandeis, Frankfurter, and Cardozo. But it did. Traditionalists and soci-
ological jurisprudents portrayed the realists as nihilists who undermined the
usefulness of legal rules without putting anything in their place,302 explained ju-
dicial opinions on the basis of what judges ate for breakfast,0 3 and imbued all
decisions of authorities, no matter how illegitimate, with the authority of law. 304
295. Thurman W. Arnold, The Jurisprudence ofEdward S. Robinson, 46 YALE L.J. 128, 128-83 (1937).
296. BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE
FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 13 (2001).
297. DUXBURY, supra note 271, at lo6-07.
298. Id. at 200 ("[L]egal realism remained a private law jurisprudence in a public law world. . .
29. Id. at lo9-11.
300. Id. at 130.
301. KALMAN, supra note 77, at 33-34.
302. See, e.g., Josef Kunz, Book Review, 8 OHIo ST. U. L.J. 243, 244 (1942); Philip Mechem, The
Jurisprudence of Despair, 21 IOWA. L. REV. 669, 672 (1936).
303. FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKEALAWYER: ANEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING
129 (2009) (suggesting the unfairness of this caricature for Frank, who is most often held
responsible for it).
304. EDWARD PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE




Most importantly for Yale's history, the realists shocked many by combining
pedagogy and politics. They worked to transform traditional legal education,
which Harvard left alone,05 and became linked to the Roosevelt Administra-
tion.306 At the same time that he scandalized white Southerners as General
Counsel of FDR's Agriculture Adjustment Administration,0 7 for example, Je-
rome Frank bellowed that legal realism made the New Deal possibleo and
baited Harvard by branding Langdell "a brilliant neurotic" who seduced Ameri-
can legal education by introducing the case method.' "To study ... eviscerated
judicial expositions as the principal bases of forecasts of future judicial action is
to delude oneself"1 0 and was like training "prospective dog breeders" with
"stuffed dogs," Frank claimed.' He advocated the case method's replacement
with a clinical-lawyer school that would place the clinic and office at the core of
the curriculum and include academics who had practiced law for a significant
period.312 His Yale contemporaries treated Frank as a beloved iconoclast and did
nothing for the moment to implement his expensive program."' But clinical ed-
ucation became important in the academy,314 especially at Yale,"' and the school
later named its primary clinic after him.3 16
305. CALMAN, LEGAL REALISMAT YALE, supra note 261, at 45-58.
306. See id. at 129-36; Robert W. Gordon, Professors and Policymakers: Yale Law School Faculty in the
New Deal and After, in HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL, supra note 76, at 74, 85-89; Marcus
J. Curtis, Realism Revisited: Reaffirming the Centrality of the New Deal in Realist Jurisprudence,
27 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 157 (2015).
307. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEw DEAL, 1933-1935, in 2 THE AGE OF
ROOSEVELT 77-81 (1951).
308. Jerome Frank, Realism in Jurisprudence, 7 AM. L. SCH. REV. 1063, 1o64 (1934).
309. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 225 (1949). For
a demonstration that Frank and the realists were unfair to Langdell, see Bruce A. Kimball, The
Langdell Problem: Historicizing the Century of Historiography, 19o6-2000s, 22 LAw & HIST REV.
277, 304-o6 (2004).
310. Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 912 (1933).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 914-16.
313. ICMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, supra note 261, at 172-73.
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214(1983).
315. See discussion infra Section II.C.
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While sharing Frank's Harvard-bashing,"' most Yale realists sought a mod-
est makeover of education that kept appellate opinions and legal doctrine central
and created an agenda for the future. Where traditionalists reveled in using an-
alytical skills to teach students that all cases were "consistent," realists employed
theirs to reveal inconsistencies and to prove that law was neither easily predicta-
ble nor determinate."' At a time of constitutional and administrative law fer-
ment, realists showed their students that law was not autonomous and that
social, political, and economic forces all shaped and were shaped by public and
private law. They gave old courses new "functional titles": Corporations
and Agency became yoked together in Business Organizations."' They exalted
the functional approach in their casebooks, where they sometimes organized
topics according to fact pattern, instead of legal concept (for example, by
relegating Mrs. Palsgraf to the section on traffic and transportation, instead
of proximate cause).3 20 They flirted with the social sciences by changing the
titles of their casebooks from "'Cases on X' to 'Cases and Materials on y'"321
and conducting expensive, frequently dreary, empirical research into legal insti-
tutions.322 Though most agreed that realists made ineffective use of the social
sciences,323 with but few exceptions,324 they did put interdisciplinary legal re-
search and education front and center on the agenda. Future academic lawyers
worked at integrating the law school with the university. That so many now pos-
sess a PhD and JD is just one testament to realism's impact.3 25 The realists cre-
ated the template for the modern law school and set the agenda for contempo-
rary legal education.
Thus, Yale realists dressed up law study in the 1930s, when their school
found its contemporary niche as the anti-Harvard, a boutique spot for legal in-
tellectuals and policy wonks.326 Naturally, Cantabridgians criticized them, and
Frandurter complained that their "overjazzing" of legal education and their
317. ICALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, supra note 261, at 119.
318. Leon H. Keyserling, Social Objectives in Legal Education, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 437, 446 n.28
(1933).
319. ICAMAN, LEGAL REALISMAT YALE, supra note 261, at 9, 85-86.
320. Id. at 87-88.
321. STEVENS, supra note 314, at 158.
322. SCHLEGEL, supra note 281, at 211.
323. ICAMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, supra note 261, at 95; SCHLEGEL, supra note 281, at 211.
324. ICAMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, supra note 261, at 92-93.
325. See infra Section II.B.




"smartaleck, wisecracking" cynicism just reflected their Harvard inferiority com-
plex.327 Reasonable people can disagree about whether Frankfurter was right,
but the realists breathed new life into Yale.
Yale became a liberal bastion and the center of the academic study of law
during the New Deal, not during Rostow's deanship, as Fiss claims. While aca-
demics elsewhere also joined the New Deal, Charles Clark differed from most
deans by glorying in Yale's association with it.3 2 8 The faculty defined itself by its
progressive politics, legal thought, and approach to education. Postwar profes-
sors continued laboring in a deep-rooted vineyard. They championed civil lib-
erties and civil rights by, among other things,32 9 joining with the NAACP to
litigate Brown;`3 o bringing early decisions championing the right to birth con-
trol;... defending communists and government employees accused of disloyalty
during the Second Red Scare;332 and urging abolition of the House Committee
on Un-American Activities.' As in the thirties, their controversial work took
guts,334 and Yale Law professors' politics tested its university's presidents.3
Since legal realism gave Yale its mystique, it is no wonder that the school has
absolutely reveled in its relationship to it. As Rostow, himself "a shovel-carrying
[1]egal [r]ealist" who joined the faculty during the heady 1930s,3 3 6 maintained,
the movement had long "represented the prevailing approach to legal studies at
the Yale Law School to a greater extent than has been the case in any other law
faculty of the world."3 Ronald Dworkin told the New York Times in the 196os
that "if you wanted to get rid of realism at Yale you'd have to flush out the place
327. Id. at 142.
328. Id. at 131-34.
329. Id. at 148-49, 158-63, 195-99.
330. Id. at 203.
331. DAVID J. GARROw, LIBERTY & SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V.
WADE 152-80 (1994).
332. KAuvAN, LEGAL REALISMAT YALE, supra note 261, at 194-99.
333. Id. at 158.
334. Id. at 147-64, 195-99.
335. Id.; Gaddis Smith, Politics and the Law School: The View from Woodbridge Hall, 1921-1963, in
HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL, supra note 76, at 138.
336. Leon Lipson, Eugene Rostow, 94 YALE L.J. 1329, 1330 (1985); see also Eugene V. Rostow, Amer-
ican Legal Realism and the Sense of the Profession, 34 ROCKY MOUNTAIN L. REV. 123 (1962) (ex-
emplifying Rostow's advocacy for legal realist principles).
337. EUGENE V. RoSTow, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE QUEST
FOR LAW, at xv (1962).
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for three years and fumigate the halls."" Look on Yale's website today and you
will find the boast that legal realism has made doctrine "less conceptual and more
empirical" and "has reshaped the way American lawyers understand the function
of legal rules and of courts and judges."3
Acknowledgment of the significance of realism to Yale is missing from Pil-
lars. While Fiss's particular brand of process theory played a role in creating legal
liberalism and the contemporary Yale, legal realism did as well. Indeed, legal re-
alism sustained Brown and the Warren Court until Fiss and others remodeled
process theory to celebrate them. Why does Fiss think Yale "embraced" Brown?
For better or worse, it was the ultimate realist opinion.340 It was functional be-
cause the Court justified it by stressing the special nature of education.3 41 It re-
lied on social science, though its (in)famous footnote 11 proved flawed.342 It
showcased law's potential to change policy. Indeed, Kenneth Mack has shown
the great civil rights lawyer Charles Hamilton Houston, Thurgood Marshall's
mentor, was steeped in legal realism,34 3 yearned to integrate law and the social
sciences,344 and called for "the functional teaching of law."345 Legal liberalism
certainly encompasses more than legal realism, but realism constitutes one cru-
cial "pillar" of legal liberalism.
Why would Fiss want to ignore Yale's realist history? One reason is that he
is a product of Harvard, an institution that, paradoxically, has historically shown
little sympathy for legal realism while marginalizing Yale's contribution to it.34 6
Further, as Arthur Leff said, realism remained frightening even after the New
338. Victor S. Navasky, The Yales vs. The Harvards (Legal Division), N.Y. TIMEs MAG., Sept. 11,
1966, at 144.
339. Our History, YALE L. SCH., http://law.yale.edu/about-yale-law-school/glance/our-history
[http://perma.cc/3YF6-CBTB].
340. See William E. Nelson, Brown v. Board of Education and the jurisprudence ofLegal Realism, 48
ST. Louis U. L.J. 795 (2004).
341. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954). This is not to say, however, that the War-
ren Court was always a "realist" one. As we have seen, for example, it subsequently relied on
Brown to suggest segregation everywhere was unconstitutional. See supra text accompanying
note 197.
342. See Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinarity, 90 COR-
NELLL. REV. 279, 292-95 (2005).
343. See KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAw-
YER43 (2012); Mack, supra note 219, at 308-18.
344. MACK, supra note 343, at 43.
345. Id. at 45.
346. ICLMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, supra note 261, at 55-66; Daniel R. Ernst, The Critical Tra-




Deal.34 7 It was partly the realist legacy that left professors despairing about the
possibility of objective foundations of justice.3 48 Some worried that realism un-
duly empowered unsympathetic judges and justices, especially after legal liberals
lost the Court in 1969.
Moreover, Pillars is aspirational. Fiss's Harvard professors turned to legal
process theory as a way to discipline law in the post-realist world. They some-
times implied that much as they approved of the Warren Court's politics, stu-
dents must "choose between rejecting progressive judicial positions for lack of
coherent, principled rationales and abandoning the commitment to principle in
frank or disguised result-orientedness."34 9 Like other legal liberals,so Fiss has
worked ceaselessly to prove his teachers wrong. Indeed, during the 1970s, thanks
partly to him, Yale emerged as the center of "the new legal process," a politically
liberal and avowedly reformist version of legal process theory that concentrated
on continuing the conversation in search of public values."' The new legal pro-
cess tamed the insights of legal realism,352 and expanded without exploding the
traditional legal process ideal of law as collectively exercised reason. Even so,
though, realism remains an important part of Yale's history and legal liberalism.
Fiss may also wash realism out of his school's past because critical legal schol-
ars, a number of whom attended or taught at Yale during "the Dark Ages,"'
honored realism's exposure of indeterminacy by rooting their movement in it
and adopting its cheekiness.3 54 Some at Yale dismissed critical legal studies by
writing it off as warmed-over legal realism;ss Fiss, despite his fondness for Hor-
witz, excoriated its effort "to unmask" law.3 56 Critical legal studies drove many
of Fiss's Yale colleagues bonkers too. It represented a threat because it insisted
law was politics; it went beyond legal realism to demonstrate that law veiled the
value systems of all decision makers, not just individual judges'; its critique of
347. Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv.
451, 454 (1974).
348. Id.
349. With the Editors... , 83 HARV. L. REv. at xxvi (1969).
350. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACYAND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
351. Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 213, 239-41 (1983).
352. KALMAN, supra note 77, at 291-94.
353. Id. at 282.
354. Id. at 282-83.
355. Id. at 288-89.
356. Id. at 172.
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rights challenged the Warren Court's rights revolution; it shredded its challeng-
ers; and it reeked of the 196os' New Left and counterculture."' Critical legal
studies "never took hold at Yale, or perhaps to put it more cynically was not al-
lowed to take hold there, certainly not in its most virulent form," Fiss acknowl-
edges."' (I maintain that the cynic's view is correct. 9) As he recognizes, during
the late twentieth century, "Yale Law School became the home of what was gen-
erally, though not entirely with affection, referred to as 'central [center?] liberal-
*S "'11360ism.'"6
Of course, not everyone considered Yale centrist. When Fiss testified against
the Supreme Court nomination of his former colleague Robert Bork in 1987,361
Republican senators wanted to know whether he really had told his students that
he knew no one who had voted for Ronald Reagan, as the Wall Street journal
reported.3 62 Fiss's answer: He probably had but was just jokingly showing how
out of touch he and other academics were.363 Nor was Yale just the home of cen-
trist liberalism. Gathering all those liberals together may have had the unin-
tended consequence of galvanizing some students on the left and right to attack
them. Why else would Yale become the cradle of critical legal studies and the
Federalist Society? 364
2. Legal Education at Yale and Beyond
With or without legal realism, I believe Yale is almost as glorious as Fiss por-
trays it. The professors who "define the school"36' are, and should be, Rostow
taught him, quirky and wacky. "The Yale faculty is indeed crazy, but crazy in the
best sense: intellectually restless, unwilling to accept conventional accounts of
357. Id. at 281-89.
358. FIss, supra note 4, at 173.
359. KALMAN, supra note 77, at 287-90.
360. FIss, supra note 4, at 173.
361. Nomination of Robert H. Bork To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, looth Cong. 2491-2513 (1987) (statement of
Owen M. Fiss, Professor, Yale Law School).
362. Id. at 2720-21; L. Gordon Crovirz, Editorial, Meet the Legal Extremists, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22,
1987, at 32.
363. Nomination of Robert H. Bork, supra note 361, at 2720-21.
364. STEVEN TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL
OF THE LAw 138-39, 166 (2008).




anything; boldly and defiantly crossing all disciplinary boundaries; and eter-
mined to push and push the law, sometimes even beyond all sensible limits," Fiss
proudly declares.3 66 While he studied civil rights litigation at Chicago, at Yale he
began writing "articles with titles like . . . 'The Forms of Justice."3 6 7
Scholarship and teaching are mutually reinforcing. Strikingly, despite its
small size, Yale produced more academic lawyers than any other law school in
the country between 1995 and 2011,368 though, as Fiss observes, most graduates
become practitioners.3 69 Many professors possess advanced degrees in other dis-
ciplines, although, Fiss disarmingly confesses, "none of us perceive the absence
of such training as a limitation on our capacity to profess on those subjects."7 o
Yale professors are supposed to allow their imaginations to take flight in the
classroom. Fiss becomes "notorious at the Yale Law School for throwing out the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the first day of his procedure class,""' and
his students nickname it "Metaprocedure" ("to distinguish it from 'real' proce-
dure").372 The Yale catalogue is full of offerings like "Tragic Choices" and "Myth,
Law, and History?,""' though Fiss reports that Yale pays ample attention to
skills training as well.3 74 It has long possessed one of the country's great clinical
programs.7 1
While most law schools encourage faculty members to publish what they
please, at Yale "this ethos is extended to the classroom, allowing each professor
the freedom - relinquished only at the rarest moments - to decide what to teach,
how to teach, even when to teach."3 76 The school functions in a state of "orga-
nized anarchy," Fiss observes.17 7 In a telling anecdote, Fiss wryly recalls his anger
when Leff asked the Dean for a list of courses that required covering, then taught
366. Id. at 190.
367. Id. at 95.
368. Top Producers of Law Teachers at the Leading Law Schools Since 1995, BRiAN LEITER's L. SCH.
RANKINGS (Jan. 31, 2011), http://leiterrankings.com/new/2o11_LawTeachers.shtml [http://
perma.cc/8QWS-5HPJ].
369. FIss, supra note 4, at 95.
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376. FIss, supra note 4, at 99.
377. Id. at 98.
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one. "Imagine discussing a teaching program with the Dean? The Registrar
maybe, but never the Dean.""' Like Kobe beef cows, Yale's academics deserve to
live like kings. It is "a professor's job to decide what is educationally desirable
and the Dean's to find funds to support this decision.""
That means there are no Friday afternoon classes, necessary courses are not
offered because no one wants to teach them, it is hard for students "to construct
a sequence of courses that leads to a progressively greater proficiency in a partic-
ular subject,"so and the curriculum seems redundant, Fiss admits. One semester
saw five seminars on judicial review - "several called just that, and others hidden
behind Yale-sounding euphemisms such as 'Constitutional Theory' or 'Slavery,
the Constitution, and the Supreme Court."""' So what?
At Yale the essential educational experience consists of the exchange of
ideas between students and faculty, and the character and quality of that
exchange depend on what each participant has to say. Every member of
the faculty could teach a course on judicial review, and indeed use the
same cases and material, and yet, I can assure you, there would be no true
redundancy.3 82
His Yale is an oasis in, while setting the standard for, the legal academy. Since
the Great Recession, the legal profession-as measured by the plunge in
law school applications, the growing student-debt burden, and disasters in
Big Law-has seemed at times on the verge of implosion." Fiss says nothing
about such problems, and liberal elite law graduates can still draw inspiration
from this book even if they struggle with upwards of $200,000 in loans.3 8 4 Fiss
does not need to address such issues because Yale navigates serenely across
troubled waters. By virtue of its many famous graduates in law and politics, it
378. Id. at 113.
379. Id. at 131.
38o. Id. at loo.
381. Id. at 99.
382. Id.
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384. Can liberal graduates of "lesser" law schools, who have the same debt burden, make it? They
lack the credentials to become law professors, and the few public interest jobs that still exist




is a celebrity in its own right.' It is "insulated" from the decline in applicants.386
Thanks to the shrewdness of Dean Guido Calabresi in negotiating the school's
financial semi-independence from the university during the 198os,8 7 the school
is loaded.3' "What other institution in all the world," Fiss rightly once asked a
colleague, "would so generously support all our endeavors in Latin America - so
ambitious, so unprecedented, and so expensive?"" Moreover, when I taught at
the law school during the spring 2001 semester, I found its students every bit as
spectacular and exhilarating as he maintains.
Yet their considerable stress, then as now, 390 suggests that Yale may be an
"Eden" only for its teachers -and, perhaps, for white male law students with
well-educated, usually well-off, college-educated parents who remain the yard-
sticks against which to measure others. Fiss recognizes that MacKinnon's lesson
that sex inequalities remain everywhere still rings true, though he argues that
feminism has had so many successes that it "has in some ways lost its radical
385. Kalman, supra note 76, at 211-12.
386. Karen Sloan, Outgoing Yale Law Dean Says School Is "Reinvigorated," NAT'LL.J. (May 11, 2017),
http://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2o17/o5/11/outgoing-yale-law-dean-says-school-is
-reinvigorated [http://perma.cc/6JAG-3GKT].
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388. Jingui Cui, Robert Post Leaves a Flourishing Yale Law School, YALE DAILY NEws (Apr. 27, 2017),
http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2o17/o4/27/robert-post-leaves-a-flourishing-yale-law
[http://perma.cc/EUV4-AZ59]; Sloan, supra note 386.
389. Owen M. Fiss, The Odd Couple, 125 YALE L.J. So, 8o5 (2016).
390. See Falling Through the Cracks: A Report on Mental Health at Yale Law School, YALE L. SCH.
MENTAL HEALTH ALLIANCE 34 (2014), http://law.yale.edu/system/files/falling through t e
cracks_12o6l4.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q5LH-8WP5] ("Regardless of their mental state at
matriculation, many students perceived the 'pressure cooker' environment of the law school
as encouraging over-commitment, isolation, and a widespread perception that activities pro-
moting mental health are indulgent or unnecessary. While Yale has a reputation as an unusu-
ally warm and caring law school, students suggested that the 'illusion of a stress-free environ-
ment' carries with it 'an implicit undertone' that there is something wrong with students who
are struggling psychologically.").
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edge" and "has been normalized.""' Its victories, he notes, include the addition
of feminist legal theorists to the Yale faculty3 92 - although not MacKinnon, de-
spite a 1990 student boycott of classes aimed at winning her tenure.'9 Yet he
writes movingly of a luncheon with women who
described in painful detail the dynamics in my first-semester procedure
class that they felt had the effect of silencing women students: sharp re-
sponses by me to some women students; my willingness to recognize
students, usually men, who repeatedly volunteered comments in class;
my failure to pose questions that might reasonably be expected to elicit a
response from women; and a tendency to recognize only the men who
happened to cluster around the podium to talk to me after class.3 94
And as Fiss admits, despite increased enrollment of women and the presence of
more women on the faculty, recent studies demonstrate that plenty of women
find the school alienating and feel the sting of discrimination,9 s though that
problem is hardly unique to Yale. 396 The same is true for students of color,
LGBTQ students, first-generation college graduates, and those conservatives
who concerned the Senate Judiciary Committee. In a warning that may apply
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392. Id. at 125-26.
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to all of them, Fiss cautions that the forces responsible for women's marginaliza-
tion may "lie far beyond the reach of the Law School, or, for that matter, any
educational institution.""' If he is right, it may not matter that the school finally
has its first woman dean and that fifty-three percent of the members of the class
of 2020 are women and forty-eight percent are students of color."
The mix of practice and theory at Yale is questionable, too. That Dean Cala-
bresi,400 then his successors,40 1 had the shrewdness and financial wherewithal to
make Jerome Frank's vision a reality proved crucial. The clinical program became
central to the school's mission. Calabresi and subsequent deans understood that
the intellectual's law school especially needed a strong clinical program. The
clinic enabled students to demonstrate idealism and acquire the "experiential"
training demanded by the ABA,402 a great thing for legal liberals at a time of
scarce resources. Yale students and graduates, for example, played a key role in
challenging President Trump's executive order barring refugees and immigration
from predominantly Muslim countries.403
But does a strong clinical program make five seminars on judicial review in
one semester in a small school more palatable? Would a little less anarchy and a
little more organization hurt Yale so much? To be heretical, I am reminded of
something Jerome Frank would say. When he admitted that some of his ablest
Agricultural Adjustment Administration lawyers were Harvard Law graduates,
398. FIss, supra note 4, at 127.
399. Dean Gerken Welcomes Most Diverse Class in YLS History, YALE L. SCH. (Aug. 21, 2017),
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Frank would add, " [TI hat may well be in spite of and not because of their method of
instruction. "404
And is Fiss's vision of education sustainable, even at Yale? Of Rostow's re-
cruits, only Joe Goldstein possessed a PhD, and most of Fiss's heroes lack one.
Like other deans, Rostow hired those with high grades, law review service, clerk-
ship(s), and, at Yale, perhaps a bit of coursework in another discipline in Eng-
land or the United States.
Yale subsequently changed the ballgame. Along with the new legal process,
Yale espoused interdisciplinarity as its strategy for achieving excellence in the
1970s, when the school still played second fiddle to Harvard.405 "What we teach,"
Harry Wellington, the dean from 1975 to 1985 boasted, "is dictated primarily by
the scholarly interests of the faculty. This approach to the curriculum is why Yale
is what it is: the most theoretical and academically oriented law school in Amer-
ica."4 06 As recently as the 199os, the average law professor at an elite school still
possessed the traditional credentials of an excellent record at a comparable law
school, law review membership, the right clerkship(s), perhaps a publication
such as a student note, and experience in practice.4 0 7 Just five percent of tenure-
track law faculty members then possessed PhDs.408 In contrast, Yale hired a crit-
ical mass of JD-PhDs in the 1970s and continued doing so ever after.4 09
When Yale became the country's preeminent law school in the 199os,41 0 it
began reshaping the world of academic lawyers and legal education. The legal
academy delights in playing "follow the leader," and more schools climbed on
the JD-PhD bandwagon. Today, the movement o hire JD-PhDs is in full swing
at elite and nonelite law schools alike.4 1 1 In 2014 and 2015, more than two-thirds
of entry-level hires at the top twenty-six schools were JD-PhDs.412 "The age of
404. Jerome N. Frank, What Constitutes a Good Legal Education, 19 A.B.A. J. 723, 727 (1933); Frank,
supra note 310, at 921.
405. So clearly established was the school's standing as second best that on the first day that Ros-
tow's successor, Louis Pollak, entered the dean's office, he found a welcome sign bearing the
slogan Avis Rental Cars popularized in its chase after Hertz, "We Try Harder." IuMAuN, supra
note 77, at 56.
406. Id. at 309.
407. Justin McCrary et al., The Ph.D. Rises in American Law Schools, 196o-2on: What Does It Mean
for Legal Education, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 543, 549, 562 (2016).
408. Id. at 549.
409. KA N, supra note 77, at 305-o6.
410. Id. at 352-55.
411. Lynn M. LoPucki, Dawn of the Discipline-Based Law Faculty, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 5o6, 510, 536
(2016).




the PhD law professor is upon us,"41 one study proclaimed recently, and JD-
PhDs will soon control the hiring process at the top law schools4 14 - if they do
not do so already.415 Robin West warns that "the faculty member with no expe-
rience at all in the practice of law is increasingly the norm,"4 1 6 and the empirical
data suggest that professors' experience in practice is declining.4 17
This hiring pattern has resulted in wonderful theoretical and interdiscipli-
nary research and has brought the law school closer to the rest of the univer-
sity.418 And interdisciplinary work can transform law practice: think of the im-
pact of law and economics on antitrust.4 19 Yet the interdisciplinary turn also
deepened the longstanding divide between academic lawyers and the bench and
bar.4 20 Richard Posner griped that Wellington turned the traditional doctrinal
legal scholar into "a paltry fellow, a Philistine who has shirked the more ambi-
tious task of mastering political and moral philosophy, economics, history, and
other social sciences and humanities so that he can discourse on large questions
413. Blake Edwards, The Age of the PhD Law Professor Is Upon Us, Study Says, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 19, 2016), http://bol.bna.com/the-age-of-the-phd-law-professor-is-upon-us-study
-says [http://perma.cc/EC4R-J7YG]; see LoPucki, supra note 411.
414. LoPucki, supra note 411, at 540.
415. My law professor friends speak of anxious discussions at faculty meetings, in which their col-
leagues worry that their hiring committees are disadvantaging job candidates who lack a PhD
and "just" possess the traditional credentials.
416. ROBIN L. WEST, TEACHING LAw: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND THE DEMANDS OF PROFESSIONALISM
151(2014).
417. LoPucki, supra note 411, at 521-31.
418. Not everyone agrees, of course. For a negative evaluation of contemporary legal scholarship,
see, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Disciplinary Legal Empiricism, 76 MD. L. REV. 449 (2017); and
Lynn M. LoPucki, Disciplining Legal Scholarship, 90 TUL. L. REv. 1 (2015). Nor do I mean to
suggest hat law professors require a PhD to produce good theoretical and/or interdisciplinary
work.
419. Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization fLegal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 MICH. L. REv.
1921, 1925 (1993).
420. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY (2016);
Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession,
91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Educa-
tion and the Legal Profession: A Postscript, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2191 (1993); Harry T. Edwards,
Another 'Postscript to 'The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession',
69 WASH. L. REv. 561 (1994). On the longstanding nature of the divide, see Laura Kalman,
Professing Law: Elite Law School Professors in the Twentieth Century, in LOOKING BACKAT LAW'S
CENTURY 337 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002).
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of policy and justice."42 1 Despite his pride in his faculty, Wellington worried
about that, too.422 And, Michael Dorf observes:
Chief Justice John Roberts encapsulated what has become the conven-
tional wisdom among judges disaffected with legal scholarship when he
said this in 2011: "Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, and the
first article is likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on
evidentiary approaches in Bulgaria."4 23
Such hyperbole aside, the long-term impact of all these JD-PhDs on legal
education and scholarship is far from clear. Do all those advanced degrees create
a fragmentation within today's law professors as they strain to master two disci-
plines, each with its own professional code?424 Do they isolate law professors
tethered to one discipline from their colleagues in another? Do they increase
their distance from students who plan to practice law? Do they dim academics'
ability to think like lawyers? Mark Tushnet jokes about "the 'lawyer as astro-
physicist' assumption" that general law-school training enables alumni to absorb
and employ any other discipline.42 5 That means lawyers know they can "read a
physics book over the weekend and send a rocket to the moon on Monday."426
Who else would possess such refreshing chutzpah ?427 But chutzpah can em-
power. We PhDs are often cautious as we patrol our special turf,4 28 and we some-
times reject "prescriptivism."4 29 Do those advanced degrees, then, make a career
like Fiss's or his subjects' less possible? Will those who possess them train stu-
dents at Yale and elsewhere to restore his "golden age" and to make Justices Mar-
shall, Brennan, and Barak their models?
421. Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113, 1119 (1981).
422. Harry H. Wellington, Challenges to Legal Education: The "Two Cultures" Phenomenon, 37 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 327, 329 (1987).
423. Michael C. Dorf, Book Review, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 186, 191 (2016) (reviewing RICHARD A.
POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY (2016)).
424. Based on my experience writing evaluation letters of legal historians in law schools for pro-
motion to tenure, for example, I sense that a book is now de rigueur. If I am correct, history-
department norms have spread to the law school. How do those expectations affect the inter-
action of legal historians with their non-legal historian colleagues?
425. Symposium, Constitutional Scholarship: What's Next?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 28, 31 (1988).
426. Id. at 68.
427. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy Relationship, 18 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 165 (20o6).
428. See, e.g., Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal Scholarship, 66
FORDHAML. REv. 87, 87-88 (1997).




C. The Future of Legal Liberalism
Even if they do, what success are students likely to enjoy? We legal liberals
sometimes have had a hard time letting go of the past. "Earl Warren is dead,"
two academics wrote in 1988, yet " [a] generation of liberal legal scholars contin-
ues, nevertheless, to act as if the man and his Court preside over the present."43 0
As Fiss's contemporaries have begun retiring, their vision has finally started
to fade.431 "We live in chastened times," Kenneth Mack said in 2012.432 The idea
of a heroic liberal Justice has taken a giant hit, both because of the Court's con-
servatism and the uncertainty that even liberal Justices can deliver lasting social
reform. Conservatives turned to the past to bolster their claims in Parents In-
volved that Brown enshrined a principle of color-blindness and "history will be
heard,"4 33 and, in Shelby, that "history did not end in 1965- 434 Liberal and left
constitutional theorists looked more towards the future. It was no accident that
when the millennium arrived, some liberal (or as they now frequently preferred
to style themselves, progressive) academic lawyers, like Cass Sunstein, Richard
Parker, Larry Kramer, Robert Post, and Reva Siegel distanced themselves from
legal liberalism, and instead began championing judicial minimalism;43 5 popu-
lar constitutionalism ;436 and, somewhat more optimistically, democratic consti-
tutionalism.4 37 Those theories supported politically liberal and left-liberal posi-
tions. But professors like Fiss who spoke of legal liberalism and stressed the
430. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Future of Liberal Legal Scholarship, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 189, 189 (1988).
431. David Fontana, Not Your Law School Graduation Speaker: Progressive Law Students Won't Hear
from the Lions of the Warren Court Again This Week, SLATE (June 4, 2014), http://www.slate
.com/articles/newstandpolitics/jurisprudence/2o14/o6/the warrencourt generation
isdying whoistaking their place-at commencement.html [http://perma.cc/QQD8
-2QGK].
432. Kenneth W. Mack, Law and Local Knowledge in the History of the Civil Rights Movement, 125
HARv. L. REV. 1018, 118 (2012) (reviewing TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE To DISSENT:
ATLANTAAND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2011)).
433. Parents Involved in Cmrty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 746 (2007).
434. Shelby Cry. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 2,10 (2013).
435. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (2d ed. 2001).
436. See, e.g., RICHARD PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE": A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANI-
FESTO (1994); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999);
Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2ooo Term -Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARv. L. REV. 5
(2001).
437. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007).
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Warren Court's nonmajoritarian nature were more proudly court centered than
their successors. Fiss bucks the headwinds in calling for a return to the sixties, a
"decade" that I agree lasted from Brown until the mid-1970s, and to legal liber-
alism. Though many concede that Brown and the Warren Court represented
milestones, some consider both problematic.
Still, there will always be revisionists. Thankfully, the chance to promote new
interpretations keeps us all employed. Reliance on courts recently paid rich div-
idends for same-sex marriage advocates.438 Moreover, the dawn of the Trump
era means Fiss's summons to the legal-liberalism ramparts is more timely than
ever. On the one hand, we live in even more "chastened times" than we did in
2012: expert knowledge is dismissed as "fake," self-interested, partisan, and elit-
ist.439 On the other hand, it sometimes seems as if lawyers and judges are all that
stand between us and the abyss.44 0 Given the conservatism of the executive
branch and Republican skill at gerrymandering legislative districts, liberals can
only hope to exert influence in the courts, at least until Trump fills all his judicial
vacancies.44 1 That may not be saying much, but it is saying something. No won-
der, then, that in the summer of 2016, Mark Tushnet - a critical legal scholar in
the 1980s442 and advocate of "taking the Constitution away from the courts" in
438. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
439. TOM NICHOLS, THE DEATH OF EXPERTISE: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST ESTABLISHED KNOWLEDGE
AND WHY IT MATTERS (2017); see also Tom Nichols, The Death of Expertise, FEDERALIST,
(Jan. 17, 2014), http://thefederalist.com/2o14/ol/17/the-death-of-expertise [http://perma.cc
/8QG4-BD5A].
440. Matt Moody, Lawyers Are Heroes of the Trump Resistance, VAULT (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www
.vault.com/blog/vaults-law-blog-legal-careers-and-industry-news/lawyers-are-heroes-of
-the-trump-resistance [http://perma.cc/C7PT-B6Q9]; Elie Mystal, University of North Caro-
lina Bans Civil Rights Center from Protecting Civil Rights, ABOvE L. (Sept. 11, 2017), http://
abovethelaw.com/2o17/o9/university-of-north-carolina-bans-civil-rights-center-from
-protecting-civil-rights [http://perma.cc/BW9U-EY2X] ("The counter-revolution- all the
hateful people and lawmakers who are popping up to stop kids from feeling safe in the bath-
room and terrorize immigrants and elect Donald Trump -is being met by lawyers. Progres-
sive lawyers are leading the charge, but even more-conservative lawyers are in the fight against
the excesses of majoritarian will.").
441. See, e.g., Billy Corriher & Anisha Singh, The Courts Have Halted Trump's Bigoted Policies, but
the Senate Wants To Confi rm All His Judges, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (June 12, 2017), http://www
americanprogress.org/issues/courts/news/2017/o6/12/4338 8 /courts-halted-trumps
-bigoted-policies-senate-wants-confirm-judges [http://perma.cc/KH9M-64DH]; Jamiles
Lartey, Civil Rights in the Era of Trump: Courts Will Be a "Bulwark," Say Leaders, GUARDIAN
(Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2o16/dec/23/civil-rights-trump-era
-courts-lawsuit-ziglar-vs-abbasi-aclu [http://perma.cc/Y4W2-JTPM].





2000!44 - called upon professors who had swung away from legal liberalism to
abandon their "defensive crouch liberal constitutionalism" and make Marshall
and Brennan their heroes again.444
Though Tushnet might disagree,44 5 the argument for embracing legal liber-
alism has grown stronger since Trump's November victory. After neo-Nazis and
other white supremacists marched on her synagogue and university,44 6 Univer-
sity of Virginia Law School Dean Risa Goluboff, another Fiss student,44 7 found
hope in Thurgood Marshall's example.44 8 We do need more lawyers like Mar-
shall and Justices like Marshall and Brennan. As another revered legal liberal,
Frank Michelman, would say, judges' actions "may augment our freedom. As
usual, it all depends."449
Selling a Brennan or Marshall to Republican and Democratic politicians,
though, is unlikely. Even as confirmation hearings feature nominees -begin-
ning, ironically, with Rehnquist in 1971- ritualistically championing Brown,450
they underline the bipartisan acceptance of a cartoon caricature of a Warren
443. TUSHNET, supra note 436.
444. Mark Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal Constitutionalism, BALKINIZATION (May
6, 2016), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2o16/o5/abandoning-defensive-crouch-liberal.html
[http://perma.cc/MZB3-6BBN].
445. As Tushnet concluded, "Of course all bets are off if Donald Trump becomes President. But if
he does, constitutional doctrine is going to be the least of our worries." Id.
446. Risa L. Goluboff, Dean Risa GoluboffReacts to Events in Charlottesville, U. VA. SCH. L. (Aug.
14, 2017), http://content.law.virginia.edu/news/201708/dean-risa-goluboff-reacts-events
-charlottesville [http://perma.cc/6DV2-MSTW]; Dahlia Lithwick, You Think It Couldn't
Happen at Your Synagogue? So Did I, REFORM JUDAISM (Aug. 24, 2017), http://reformjudaism
.org/blog/2o17/o8/24/you-think-it-couldnt-happen-your-synagogue-so-did-I [http://
perma.cc/BFG6-PZHG]; Summer Newsletter-5776, CONGREGATION BETH ISRAEL, http://
myemail.constantcontact.com/CBI-Quarterly-Newletter---Summer-Issue.html?soid
= 1102546520920&aid=cgnuCdzlET8 [http://perma.cc/B8PV-GBCF] (showing that Dean
Risa Goluboff is a member of the congregation).
447. E-mail from Risa Goluboff, Dean, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, to author (Aug. 27, 2017, 7:01 AM
EST) (on file with author).
448. Goluboff, supra note 446.
449. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term -Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, loo
HARV. L. REV. 4,75 (1986).
450. Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of Education, 52 RUTGERS L.
REv. 383, 431-36 (2000). It was ironic because allegations that Justice Rehnquist had spoken
out against Brown as Justice Jackson's clerk almost derailed his nomination. Id. at 442-46, 451-
57; Brad Snyder & John Q. Barrett, Rehnquist's Missing Letter: A Former Law Clerk's 1955
Thoughts on justice Jackson and Brown, 53 B.C. L. REv. 631, 634, n.1o (2012) (collecting cita-
tions).
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Court that militantly defied majority will. This caricature has molded the con-
temporary Republican Party, which has melded together diverse factions in part
by making the Warren Court a whipping boy.4 51
Thanks to the burlesque images of it that abound, the Warren Court has be-
come such a symbol of excess that even Democratic Presidents steer clear of nom-
inating a present-day Brennan or Marshall. Moderates Clinton and Obama tried
to respect the Warren Court and relegate it to the past by nominating justices
slightly left of center, who did not believe the Supreme Court should make law
the great engine of social change.452 Fiss student Jeffrey Rosen453 cheered this
development. By choosing then-Judge Ginsburg and Fiss's Harvard classmate,
then-Judge Breyer, Rosen wrote, the Democrats escaped "the ideological ex-
cesses" of "Warrenism"4 54 and ended "the age of judicial heroics."455 Candidate
Obama stressed that judicial "activists" of the sixties "ignored the will of Con-
gress" and "democratic processes."45 6 Nevertheless, liberals hoped he would ap-
point a "bomb-throwing, passionate, visionary liberal Scalia" like Brennan and
451. MARK TUSHNET, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A CONTEXTUAL
ANALYSIS 228 (2009).
452. MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE NEw POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT CONFIRMA-
TIONS 80 (2007); Linda Greenhouse, The Nation, Judged in the Shadow of the Ghosts from
the Past, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/o5/22/weekinreview
/the-nation-judged-in-the-shadow-of-ghosts-from-the-past.html [http://perma.cc/K45Q
-EP58] (describing President Clinton's nomination of then-Judge Breyer); Neil A. Lewis,
High Court Nominee Faces Easy Road Through Senate, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 1993), http://
www.nytimes.com/1993/07/20/us/high-court-nominee-faces-easy-road-through-senate
.html [http://perma.cc/98GP-LZQM] (describing President Clinton's nomination of then-
Chief Judge Ginsburg).
453. Nat'l Constitution Ctr., Owen Fiss: Lawyers and the Liberal Tradition (HD), YouTUBE (July 13,
2017), http://www.youtube.com/watchv= qrbpoSnjfao.
454. Jeffrey Rosen, Even Stephen, NEw REPUBLIC (June 6, 1994), http://newrepublic.com/aricle
/73758/even-stephen [http://perma.cc/GA4P-8Z6N].
455- Id.
456. BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS ON RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN DREAM
82 (20o6); Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Says Liberal Courts May Have Over-





Marshall who would shove, not nudge, the Supreme Court to the left.45 7 We
were disappointed.458
The experience of one Obama nominee before the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee proved illuminating. Though the Wall StreetJournal reported that Elena Ka-
gan had accused the Warren Court of "overreaching" in her Oxford thesis,4 59
Republicans mentioned Marshall, for whom she clerked, repeatedly during her
hearing. Republican Senator John Kyl asked: Would she, like Marshall, use law
to help the disadvantaged? Like other recent nominees, Kagan emphasized her
own neutrality and objectivity, responding, " [Y] ou'll get Justice Kagan. You
won't get Justice Marshall, and that's an important thing."4 60 That did not an-
swer his question, Kyl observed.46 1 We expect nominees to weasel, but the ex-
change reminds us that few in Washington seek a Warren Court restoration. A
Washington Post op-ed was semifacetiously entitled "Kagan May Get Confirmed,
but Thurgood Marshall Can Forget It."462 Appointing Justices like Marshall and
Brennan and winning decisions as full-throated as Brown may prove impossible.
How then, can legal liberalism have a renaissance?
457. Adam Liptak, To Nudge, Shift or Shove the Supreme Court Left, N.Y. TiMES (Jan. 31, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/o2/ol/weekinreview/olliptak.html [http://perma.cc/L7VU
-YJUW]; Dahlia Lithwick, I Need a Hero: Seeking a Bomb-Throwing, Passionate, Visionary, Lib-
eral Scalia for a Seat on the Supreme Court, SLATE (Feb. 3, 2009, 7 :04 PM), http://www.slate
.com/articles/news-and politics/jurisprudence/2009/02/i need a hero.html [http://
perma.cc/ABH2-JS5K].
458. Jess Bravin, Kagan Distances Herself rom Left-Leaning Movements, WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2010,
8:15 PM EST), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBloool4240527487040756045753575118690
44130 [http://perma.cc/FY9Q-FSSH]; David G. Savage & Christi Parsons, Supreme Court
Nomination: A Historic Appointment; A Latina in the Middle, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 20o9, atAi.
459. Nathan Koppel, Kagan Criticized the Warren Court in Thesis, WALL ST. J. (May 18, 2010, 11:21
PM EST), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704912004575252791294404162
[http://perma.cc/NCB2-2V6Q].
46o. The Nomination of Elena Kagan To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 106 (2010) (statement of
Elena Kagan, Solicitor Gen. of the United States); Mark Walsh, You'll GetJustice Kagan, You
Won't GetJustice Marshall, A.B.A. J. (June 29, 2010 5:o8 PM), http://www.abajoumal.com
/news/article/sessions-to kagan-i would have-to classify you as-a legal progressive
[http://perma.cc/2MS3-DQ7A].
461. The Nomination ofElena Kagan To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, supra note 460.
462. Dana Milbank, Kagan May Get Confirmed, but Thurgood Marshall Can Forget It, WASH. POST
(June 29, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2olo/o6/28
/AR2o1oo62805129.html [http://perma.cc/CF9U-XXEQ].
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D. The Prices Paid
In pondering the last question, it is worth considering, finally, the role of
family in Fiss's book and in making legal liberalism and his own eminent pro-
fessional life possible. I wish Fiss had said more about his family. He does tell us
his wife's name, and elsewhere he has characterized Irene Fiss, an educational
consultant who founded and directed a progressive New Haven elementary
school,4 63 as his "muse."4 64 He limits his comments about his three daughters to
the familiar parental lament that they proved difficult teenagers.465 In fact, they
have given Fiss a passel of grandchildren to whom he dedicates the volume
" [f ]or the joy with which they infuse my life and for the promise they bring to
the world.4 6 6 Yet, despite his restricted remarks about his own relatives, Fiss of-
ten mentions how much his subjects love their children and spouses.4 6 7
Without a doubt, though, his heroes' professional lives took a toll on them
and their families, and I found myself wondering whether Fiss would want a
grandchild to marry any of them. Because their relationship had become strained
and he was rarely home, according to one biographer, Marshall was "among the
last" to learn that his first wife had cancer and faced going "from frustration with
his crumbling marriage to the reality that his wife was dying."4 68 What one for-
mer clerk called Brennan's "backslapping leprechaun exterior "469 covered up his
refusal, or inability, to discuss his own inner thoughts and domestic problems.
Both Marjorie Brennan, who did the parenting,4 70 and a son became alcohol-
ics.4 7 1 justice Brennan "came home each night to grim dinners in Georgetown,
where he turned up the volume on the news radio station to fill the silence left
by his sullen wife ,"472 his authorized biographers report. Doar was away from
463. See Duo Dickinson, Growing in Place: Cold Spring School in New Haven Expands, HARTFORD
COURANT (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.courant.com/new-haven-living/cover-stories/hc-nh
-cold-spring-school-february-20151021-story.html [http://perma.cc/CB39-ZP3W]; History,
COLD SPRING SCH., http://www.coldspringschool.org/About/History [http://perma.cc
/9EFC-SRR8].
464. Owen Fiss, In the Shadow of War, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 449, 450 (2003).
465. FIss, supra note 4, at 129, 155.
466. Id. at author acknowledgement page.
467. See, e.g., id. at 27-28, 53, 72, 129, 148, 154-55.
468. JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 234 (1998).
469. SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 248, 206 (2010).
470. Id. at 61.
471. Id. at 206, 459.




home for weeks at a time.4 73 Several of these men died young: Kalven was just
sixty;474 Nino, forty-nine;4 75 Leff, forty-six; 4 76 Cover, forty-two.4 77 Nino, Leff,
and Cover each left a wife and two children, who had to grow up without a par-
ent.
Work may not have caused all these early deaths. Leff had cancer, and Kalven,
Cover, and Nino died of heart attacks. But it likely played a role in Nino's case.
Knowing he had trouble at high altitudes,4 78 he still flew to La Paz, nearly 12,000
feet above sea level, to draft the country's constitution. Why, a mentor asked,
"trying to make sense of this enormous tragedy, did Carlos go to Bolivia?"4 79
The grief-stricken Fiss did not reply but later realized that "there can be no doubt
about the answer. Carlos was impelled to go to Bolivia, and to Germany, Czech-
oslovakia, Colombia, and countless other countries by the same sense of civil
obligation that drove him in Argentina, and that soon extended to the entire
world."4 80
Is such a life as conceivable today as it once was? Fiss profiles only one
woman, MacKinnon, and as he acknowledges, the women of his generation
rarely got a chance at careers like hers, Nino's, or Doar's. Fiss's class at Harvard
included some extraordinary ones, like future Representative Pat Schroeder and
D.C. Circuit Judge Judith Rogers,481 but there were just fifteen of them.48 2 Be-
fore and even during the 1970s, Yale had few tenured women professors.483 And,
like Marjorie Brennan, women were doing most of the parenting. Some men Fiss
473. FIss, supra note 4, at 53.
474. Tom Goldstein, Harry Kalven Jr. Is Dead at 6o; Jury Expert Taught at Chicago, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 30, 1974), http://www.nytimes.com/1974/10/30/archives/harry-kalven-jr-is-dead-at
-60-jury-expert-taught-at-chicago.html [http://perma.cc/E2RQ-3JDX].
475. FIss, supra note 4, at 147.
476. Marcia Chambers, Arthur A. Leff Is Dead at 46; Professor at Yale Law School, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 4, 1981), http://www.nytimes.com/1981/11/o4/obituaries/arthur-a-leff-is-dead-at-46
-professor-at-yale-law-school.html [http://perma.cc/W98J-XRLR].
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discusses married women with active professional lives, as he himself did. For
example, Joe Goldstein's wife and co-author, Sonja, a Yale graduate, specialized
in children and the law.484 More frequently, however, the spouses of Fiss's sub-
jects did not work outside the home, at least while the children were small, or if
they did, were conditioned to consider their own careers secondary to those of
their spouses. Because Harry Kalven did not drive, his wife Betty chauffeured
him around Hyde Park.485
The women did hard, hidden work, which is not always done today, and
which deserves more of a place in Pillars ofJustice. Fiss jokes about how he chose
where to live in 1974.
No fool, I spent that summer in Washington, D.C., working on the
Nixon impeachment. It was Irene who was unloading the crates in New
Haven, trying to convince the kids of the wonders of their new
hometown, discovering a new pizza restaurant each night, and living in
the Covers' third-floor apartment in Davenport College until our house
was ready.4 8 6
Upon reading that sentence, this New Haven pizza aficionada decided that if Fiss
relinquished that daily diet, his family's adjustment must have been dreadful.
The wives did not just settle the family after their husbands' "call" to Yale, either.
They engineered the frequent dinner parties that contributed to the school's
clubbiness and collegiality at the same time that they drove carpools, cooked the
meals, volunteered, and, sometimes, also worked outside the home. When a
professor or a member of his family was ill, they were there. When I interviewed
aging Yale faculty members during the late 1970s, I saw how intimately they
knew each other - and how much work their spouses had done to make Yale a
community. That raises the issue of whether something has been lost - that sense
of family that once sometimes characterized the law school world during the
days when spouses (mostly wives) helped knit faculty members (mostly hus-
bands) together.
For today, few in the academy and the legal profession, where two-career
couples abound, still select a traditional spouse. Of course, that need not limit
parental involvement. Yale Law School Dean Heather Gerken has produced at
484. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD, ALBERT J. SOLNIT & SONJA GOLDSTEIN, IN THE BEST IN-
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least eight vampire novels full of life lessons for her tween daughter,4 8 7 and her
colleague, Amy Chua, is a proud "tiger mother."4 88 And marriage to a spouse
who works outside the home would not necessarily bar a future Nino from trav-
eling globally to pursue constitutional democracy or a Doar from decamping for
extended periods. But scheduling pressures might make it more difficult than
ever to focus so intently on one's own career, just as they might also cut down
the opportunity to develop deep friendships with colleagues. As Anne-Marie
Slaughter came to realize, perhaps no one, man or woman, can "have it all" - a
satisfactory work-life balance - in contemporary society.489 Given the high price
sometimes entailed for oneself and/or one's family, and the fact that most of us
no longer possess a traditional spouse, is the quest for Fiss's great liberal life in
law justified, and is success in achieving it likely?
To be sure, Fiss provides us with great role models. And antiheroes, as well
as heroes, can work themselves to the bone. Bad things happen to good and bad
people. Still, the families of Fiss's exemplars bore the burden of their absence in
death and sometimes, at least in the case of Doar and Nino, in life. As a collection
of character sketches, Pillars ofJustice is as engrossing and engaging as John Au-
brey's seventeenth-century compilation of short biographies in Brief Lives. But
we should also remember that the lives of some of Fiss's heroes were all too
brief.4 90
CONCLUSION
As Anthony Powell wrote of Aubrey, Fiss's "character and gifts" are "both of
a most unusual order."4 91 Particularly given the importance of legal realism to
Yale, I wish he had acknowledged its place under the umbrella of legal liberalism,
and I question his bullishness about legal education. But Fiss reminds us of the
wonder of Brown and the Warren Court, and the historic role of legal and judicial
actors in achieving equal justice through law. Whether Yale students or anyone
else can revive legal liberalism remains to be seen. Against the odds, though, Fiss
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has resisted cynicism and continued the struggle. He could have written a jere-
miad about the world legal liberals have lost. Instead, Fiss inspires us to restore
it.
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